

16 OCTOBER 1947

I N D E X  
of  
WITNESSES

Defense' Witnesses

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Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan 31064

MORNING RECESS 31116

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NOON RECESS 31158

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan 31159

AFTERNOON RECESS 31210

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Logan 31211

Direct (cont'd) by Mr. Furness 31216

I N D E X  
of  
EXHIBITS  
(none)

1 Thursday, 16 October 1947

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3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting,  
14 with the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE R. B. PAL,  
15 Member from India, not sitting from 0930 to 1600;  
16 HONORABLE JUSTICE HENRI BERNARD, Member from the  
17 Republic of France, not sitting from 1500 to 1600.

18 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

19 For the Defense Section, same as before.

20 - - -

21 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
22 to English interpretation was made by the  
23 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except SHIRATORI, who is represented by counsel. We  
5 have a certificate from the prison surgeon at Sugamo  
6 certifying that he is ill and unable to attend the  
7 trial today. This certificate will be recorded and  
8 filed.

9 Mr. Logan.

10 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I shall  
11 continue reading KIDO's affidavit, page 216, paragraph  
12 255.

13  
14 K O I C H I K I D O, an accused, resumed the stand  
15 and testified through Japanese interpreters as  
16 follows:

17 DIRECT EXAMINATION

18 MR. LOGAN (Continuing): "255. The Midway  
19 campaign ended in a big failure early in June 1942  
20 so that Japan's fleet air force was swept out of  
21 existence. With her limited building capacity, it  
22 was foreseen that it would be no easy task for the  
23 Japanese Navy to build replacements. The necessity  
24 for seizing occasion at the earliest possible oppor-  
25 tunity to save the situation was again brought home

1 to me. My diary for June 6, 1942 says:

2 "June 6, 1942. At 1:00 p.m., Aide-de-  
3 Camp SAMEJIMA came to my room and told me that a  
4 battle took place between the Japanese and American  
5 fleets off Midway and unfortunately Japan's fleet  
6 air force suffered big damage this time. The Chief  
7 Aide-de-Camp also came to my room and told me to the  
8 same effect.'

9 "256. About this time there were found some  
10 in the intellectual classes who thought seriously  
11 about the necessity for hastening the return of peace.  
12 They were brought to my notice one after another in  
13 succession. Mr. YOSHIDA Shigeru (former Ambassador  
14 to England) was one of them. He called on me on  
15 June 11, 1942 when he told me about a plan to make  
16 Prince KONOYE go to Europe and sojourn in Switzer-  
17 land without any definite mission so as to get in  
18 touch with leaders of various countries when an oppor-  
19 tunity presented itself. He added that it would be  
20 necessary not to miss the opportunity to pave the  
21 way for the termination of the war. I had no objec-  
22 tion to his basic idea to strive to terminate the  
23 war as soon as possible for the sake of world peace,  
24 but told him in reply that I should like to think  
25 more over the propriety or otherwise of Prince KONOYE's



1 immediate visit to Europe. Mr. YOSHIDA and I  
2 pledged each other to do our bit for the early  
3 return of peace. My diary for June 11, 1942 says:

4 "June 11, 1942. \*\*\* At 3:30 p.m.

5 Mr. YOSHIDA, Shigeru called on me. He told me that  
6 he had submitted a plan of Prince KONOYE's visit to  
7 Europe to the Prince, as in the annexed paper. He  
8 sought my views on it. I replied to him that I have,  
9 of course, no objection to the basic idea that we  
10 must exert ourselves to terminate the war as soon as  
11 possible for the sake of world peace, but replied  
12 to him that I should like to think over Prince  
13 KONOYE's immediate visit to Europe.'

14 "However, nothing ever came of this.

15 "257. Prosecution exhibit 1273, my diary  
16 of September 1, 1942 reveals the circumstances sur-  
17 rounding the resignation of TOGO from the TOJO  
18 Cabinet, because the former objected to the establish-  
19 ment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. As regards  
20 this problem, I did not, from the rationalistic  
21 point of view, dissent from the opinion of Foreign  
22 Minister TOGO. I thought, however, that the first  
23 thing to be avoided was a change of government under  
24 these circumstances, namely, in the course of the  
25 great war and that it would result, as it were, in

1 reinforcing the enemy if Japan were to bring about  
2 a change of government while there was no change of  
3 the cabinet of any of Japan's enemies. Being de-  
4 sirable of evading a great political change as far  
5 as possible, I used my good offices as set forth in  
6 the diary. Abolition of the special service agencies  
7 in China was one of the purposes of establishing the  
8 Ministry of Greater East Asia.

9 "258. The court martial of the American  
10 flyers was under the Chief of the General Staff. On  
11 October 3, 1942 Premier TOJO told me about the dis-  
12 position of the American flyers. (The diary entry  
13 of October 3, 1942, prosecution exhibit 1987, says,  
14 'treatment of American prisoners.' The Japanese word  
15 I used is 'Shobun,' which means 'disposition.' I  
16 was not told of any 'treatment.' The Premier told  
17 me at that time that he was advised of the punishment  
18 which was going to be inflicted, that is, death, but  
19 that he caused the penalty for most of them to be  
20 reduced according to His Majesty's benevolence. At  
21 his request I reported this to the Throne, pending  
22 a report by the responsible authority--the Chief of  
23 the General Staff. I know nothing of the treatment  
24 of the flyers while they were prisoners.  
25

"259. The development of the war situation



1 was progressing decidedly against Japan. A counter-  
2 offensive campaign against Guadalcanal Island had  
3 been started, while Japan's campaign against Port  
4 Moresby ended in a failure. With the passage of  
5 every day, the war situation further worsened against  
6 Japan. The Japanese forces in New Guinea were  
7 steadily pressed back with Rabaul completely isolated.  
8 The necessity for terminating hostilities without  
9 delay was further driven home to me. My diary for  
10 February 4, 1943 says:

11 "February 4, 1943. At 3:00 p.m. went to  
12 the residence of Marquis MATSUDAIRA where I had an  
13 exchange of views with Prince KONOYE and Marquis  
14 MATSUDAIRA on the future of the political situation,  
15 the Red peril and the outlook on the war. I remained  
16 with them till shortly after six o'clock."

17 "260. The meeting was held at the request  
18 of Prince KONOYE, who, taking an extremely pessimistic  
19 view of the war situation, repeatedly stressed the  
20 necessity for terminating the war without further  
21 delay on the ground that the communist movement would  
22 become recrudescant if the home structure were put to  
23 strain any longer. Marquis MATSUDAIRA and I shared  
24 the Prince's concern and pledged together with the  
25 latter never to miss the opportunity to terminate the

1 war. My diary for March 30, 1943 says:

2 "March 30, 1943. Had an audience with  
3 the Emperor from 10:30 a.m. to noon when His Majesty  
4 talked about the outlook on the war and other topics  
5 for an unusually long time. I also submitted my  
6 frank views to the Throne."

7 "His Majesty on that occasion expressed his  
8 concern over the future of the war situation, especial-  
9 ly Germany's war situation and told me about the  
10 necessity for terminating the war without a moment's  
11 delay. In reply, I stated my views frankly on the  
12 basis of my talks with Prince KONOYE and Marquis  
13 MATSUDAIRA on February 4, 1943.

14 "261. On the evening of April 20, 1943  
15 Prime Minister TOJO called on me when he told me that  
16 he decided to reconstruct his cabinet in the light of  
17 the home and foreign situation. As the result of  
18 this cabinet reconstruction, Mr. Mamoru SHIGEMITSU  
19 was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. I found  
20 for the first time a partner to talk to about my  
21 peace moves in the person of Mr. SHIGEMITSU, one of  
22 my trusted friends, who was now offered the portfolio  
23 of Foreign Affairs. From then up to Japan's surrender,  
24 I worked in close teamwork with Mr. SHIGEMITSU for the  
25 termination of the war. My diary of May 13, 1943,



1 prosecution exhibit 1274, relates that we had an  
2 exchange of views on world affairs. Germany's  
3 submarine warfare in the Atlantic suddenly began to  
4 lose its power. In consequence, the prospect of war  
5 became extremely pessimistic. Then Foreign Minister  
6 SHIGEMITSU mentioned the account of Ambassador  
7 Stahmer on the status quo of Germany. I all the  
8 more keenly felt the necessity of efforts for earlier  
9 conclusion of the war. It was at this meeting that I  
10 confided in him for the first time my idea of peace  
11 moves, one part of which was army control through a  
12 Prince of the blood. The following day, that is,  
13 May 14, 1943, when I was received by Prince TAKAMATSU,  
14 I told His Highness that 'in case such a situation  
15 arises as requires peace moves, it will be most  
16 difficult to adjust the fighting services' demands  
17 with the peace terms and in such a contingency, His  
18 Highness will be requested to redouble his efforts,'  
19 as mentioned in my diary for the day. Judging by  
20 the relations between the German Government and its  
21 Army during the first world war, the German Army  
22 inwardly wanted peace, and yet was thinking of terms,  
23 which would be difficult of fulfillment. Fearing that  
24 a similar situation might occur in Japan, I told  
25 Prince TAKAMATSU that in such an eventuality no

1 solution would be forthcoming unless intervention of  
2 a Prince of the blood was invoked. My diary for that  
3 day states:

4 "May 14, 1943. Prince TAKAMATSU called at  
5 my office and stayed from 1:40 for about an hour. At  
6 his request, I explained to him the circumstances of  
7 the reorganization of the cabinet and gave my opinion  
8 on the prospects of the World War. He gave his com-  
9 ments on the subjects. Then I said that in case we  
10 should come to negotiate for peace, the hardest of  
11 hard tasks for us would be to reconcile the demands  
12 of the military with the terms of peace and that in  
13 such a case we should have to rely on the Prince's  
14 special assistance in solving the problem.'

15 "262. The turn of the year warranted no  
16 optimism, but on the contrary the outlook was a very  
17 dreary one. I wrote a memorandum on the outlook of  
18 the war and also a peace plan. On January 6, 1944  
19 when I attended office, I had talks with Marquis  
20 MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, about Germany's destiny  
21 and Japan's policy toward the subsequent situation and  
22 asked him to make further studies on the subject. My  
23 thoughts are contained in my diary for January 6, 1944,  
24 prosecution exhibit 1276. That exhibit sets forth my  
25 ideas as expressed to Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA, that



1 Japan should act on her own judgment in case Germany  
2 surrendered unconditionally, that if the so-called  
3 ABCD encirclement line was broken, Japan's war aim  
4 would have been fulfilled, and, therefore, the Pacific  
5 War should be terminated by making large-scale con-  
6 cessions on Japan's part and that the peace terms  
7 should comprise: the Pacific question to be handled  
8 by a joint commission of Japan, the Soviet Union,  
9 China, Britain and America; the area under Japanese  
10 occupation to be demilitarized; the smaller nations  
11 in the Pacific area to be neutralized permanently;  
12 and the economic policy in the Pacific area to be  
13 based on liberalism and equal opportunity. I also  
14 stated that Japan should devote the coming century  
15 to fostering her national resources at home and that  
16 during this period she should cooperate with the  
17 Soviet Union and China to provide against a general  
18 attack. In other words, Japan should build up a  
19 defense to meet the changing circumstances. I there-  
20 fore arranged all my views as set forth in the diary  
21 and told them to MATSUDAIRA whom I asked to sound  
22 various circles about it. I also told Foreign Min-  
23 ister SHIGEMITSU of this plan. His opinion was still  
24 more pessimistic than mine. He said that very serious  
25 determination was required, in other words,

KIDO

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1 substantially unconditional surrender would be  
2 unavoidable. As a result, I was silent on this  
3 particular plan to government circles after all.  
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1 "263. Having exposed as it did the so-called  
2 real power of an 'invincible fleet,' the Navy's fail-  
3 ure in the Saipan campaign in June, 1944, exercised  
4 deep and far-reaching effects on the nation which had  
5 hitherto reposed absolute confidence on their fleet.  
6 It was entirely different in nature from the loss of  
7 a single sea battle. The situation made me think it  
8 extremely dangerous to be led by wishful observations  
9 in defiance of realities. I had been in close touch  
10 with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about peace moves.  
11 For instance, my diary for June 26, 1944, says:  
12 'At 3:30 p.m., I went to my official residence where  
13 I had talks with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about the  
14 outlook on the war and Japan's foreign policy.' On  
15 that occasion, the Foreign Minister and I pieced to-  
16 gether various informations and had a free and frank  
17 exchange of views, as the result of which the follow-  
18 ing conclusion was reached: 'The Government has no  
19 intention to take action, while the fighting services  
20 are recklessly pushing the war. There is almost no  
21 chance of success, therefore, even if peace moves are  
22 taken on these quarters. Should the secret leak out,  
23 it would defeat the purpose. Not only that, the  
24 fighting services would stiffen in their attitude, so  
25 that they might make a firm determination to die game

(gyukusai). Such being the case, it will be extremely difficult to take peace moves on these quarters.' In this connection, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU suggested that Senior Statesmen be made to serve the Emperor close to him so as to strengthen the Imperial Court. In reply, I said that it would be not only problematical whether Senior Statesmen would be able to render services as expected, even if they were made to serve the Emperor close to him but further stimulate the public, which might regard them as Japanese Badoglios. An agreement of views was reached by the Foreign Minister and me that there would be no course left, therefore, but to take action on the strength of Imperial decision, in case an opportunity presented itself, on the part of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, assuming full responsibility, respectively for the Imperial Court and the Government. I pledged with the Foreign Minister to do our best together for the restoration of peace.

"264. Again on June 29, 1944, I had talks with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA about the measures for terminating the war. Further, I called on Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, Minister of the Imperial Household, at his room and had talks with him about the same question. At



1 that time I thought of peace moves the same as which  
2 I later took in Japan's surrender. In other words,  
3 my peace plan was aimed at negotiating direct with  
4 America, by obtaining the Emperor's personal message  
5 and, in case of necessity, taking charge of the negoti-  
6 ation on my part. In point of execution, there was  
7 much room for study in the plan, which failed to  
8 materialize at that time but which later was success-  
9 ful. My diary for June 29, 1944, says:

10 "June 29, 1944. I had talks with Chief  
11 Secretary MATSUDAIRA about the measures for terminat-  
12 ing the war. At 1:30 p.m., I called on Mr. MATSUDAIRA,  
13 Tsuneo, at his room and had talks with him about the  
14 same question.'

15 "265. Senior statesmen, who worried over the  
16 rapidly changing situation, began to be more and more  
17 active. On the other hand, a meeting of eight generals  
18 and admirals was reported in connection with the rapid-  
19 ly worsening war and political situation. On my part  
20 I had an increasing number of visitors. I received  
21 visits from Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU on July 6,  
22 1944, from Prince KONOYE on July 8, 1944, and from  
23 Minister of State KISHI, and Home Minister ANDO on  
24 July 10, 1944. I was also acquainted with the trend  
25 of the Cabinet. And I was aware of strong indications

1 of an imminent political change. My diary for July 3,  
2 1944, says:

3 "July 3, 1944: I had information from Chief  
4 Secretary MATSUDAIRA on the movements of senior  
5 statesmen. He told me: "Admiral OKADA called on  
6 Baron HIRANUMA when the Admiral had talks with the  
7 Baron about the outlook on the war. Admiral OKADA  
8 contended that it would be necessary to change the  
9 Cabinet, while Baron HIRANUMA held that a memorial be  
10 filed by the senior statesmen with the Throne in this  
11 connection. Whereanent Admiral OKADA called on Prince  
12 KONOYE." At 12:30 p.m., I had talks with Aide-de-  
13 Camp NAKAMURA about the actual condition of the Navy.  
14 At 1:00 p.m., Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, Minister of the  
15 Imperial Household came to my room and had talks with  
16 me about the measures for coping with the situation.  
17 At 7:30 p.m., Mr. ABE, Genki, called on me, when I had  
18 talks with him about the current political situation.'

19 "266. The situation became so bad that  
20 Premier TOJO decided to reorganize his Cabinet again.  
21 At 12:30 a.m. on July 17, 1944, he called on me and  
22 handed me a paper setting forth his proposals. These  
23 are set forth in prosecution exhibit 1277, as corrected  
24 by the Language Section, which exhibit shows I only  
25 acknowledged receipt of his paper. I made no comment



1 on his proposals about the policies of the Cabinet,  
2 that is, the establishment of the High Command, change  
3 of the Navy Minister and renovation and strengthening  
4 of the Liaison Conference between the Government and  
5 the High Command. The exhibit also shows that at 4:00  
6 p.m., Prince KONOYE called on me at my official resi-  
7 dence when I told him about the proposals of the Prime  
8 Minister. Towards evening, a meeting of some of the  
9 Senior Statesmen took place at the residence of Baron  
10 HIRANUMA, as the result of which Admiral OKADA called  
11 on me at my home at 9:30 p.m. and told me about an  
12 agreement of views, reached by the Senior Statesmen.  
13 Whereupon I asked Admiral OKADA if his talk to me was  
14 to be interpreted as information on a gathering of  
15 Senior Statesmen, that is, if he called on me by way  
16 of liaison. As his answer was in the affirmative, I  
17 received his report as such.  
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1 "267. The foregoing appears in exhibit 1277  
2 and the informal decision of the senior statesmen is  
3 also shown in the same exhibit as follows:

4 "In order to find our way through the  
5 current difficult situation, it is necessary to  
6 renew the popular mind. All people must rally and  
7 cooperate to build a powerful national cabinet which  
8 will surge forward unswervingly. A partial reorgan-  
9 ization of the cabinet will not be of any use."

10 "Meanwhile, Prime Minister TOJO failed in  
11 enlisting the services of General ABE and Admiral  
12 YONAI as cabinet members, while Minister of State  
13 Without Portfolio KISHI contended that now that the  
14 cabinet failed in its efforts to reconstruct itself  
15 by enlisting the services of senior statesmen as  
16 cabinet members, it should resign en bloc.

17 "268. At 9:30 A.M. the next day, July 18,  
18 1944, Prime Minister TOJO proceeded to the palace.  
19 I met him at the first resting room when he told me  
20 that he had made up his mind to carry out a resignation  
21 of his cabinet en bloc. It surprised me, especially  
22 in view of the developments of the situation since  
23 yesterday morning. It was so sudden. But I refrained  
24 from making any comment, as I thought that a cabinet  
25 change would be desirable in the light of the



1 prevailling political situation. However, I asked  
2 Prime Minister TOJO about his idea on a succeeding  
3 Prime Minister, as I did every outgoing premier.  
4 Prime Minister TOJO, who apparently was much dissatisfied  
5 over the senior statesmen's attitude, replied:

6 "I think that the senior statesmen's  
7 responsibility for the present cabinet change is  
8 heavy. In consequence, they may have already formulated  
9 their own plan. Therefore, I will not express my views."

10 "The TOJO Cabinet resigned en bloc and, in  
11 pursuance of the Imperial Command, a meeting of  
12 senior statesmen was held at 4:00 P.M., July 18, 1944,  
13 to select a succeeding prime minister.

14 "269. At the meeting of the senior statesmen  
15 it was thought it was necessary to modify the TOJO  
16 Cabinet's policy of strong economic policy on the one  
17 hand and on the other exercise sufficient political  
18 ability to grasp the trend of popular sentiments.  
19 From this angle, it might be suggested to select a  
20 succeeding prime minister from among the civil services,  
21 but the trouble was that no suitable candidate was  
22 found in this direction. Further, in view of the  
23 war situation, which was still at its bitterest stage,  
24 the senior statesmen reached an agreement of views  
25 that a succeeding prime minister be chosen from among

1 the fighting services, thereby smoothing the relations  
2 between the new Cabinet and the High Command. In this  
3 connection, however, it was further agreed that choice  
4 not be limited to the men in active service. Various  
5 views were advanced, but it was eventually agreed  
6 that Marshal TERAUCHI and General KOISO be chosen  
7 respectively as the first and second candidates for  
8 the next prime minister. On the strength of their  
9 personal knowledge of General KOISO who was their cabinet  
10 colleague under the YONAI and HIRANUMA Cabinets, both  
11 Admiral YONAI and Baron HIRANUMA recommended the  
12 General as succeeding prime minister for his political  
13 vision, iron nerves and broadmindedness, unlike the  
14 outgoing Prime Minister. My diary of July 18, 1944,  
15 prosecution exhibit 1278, sets forth in full the senior  
16 statesmen's conference. The prosecution read a very  
17 few paragraphs of this exhibit. The complete entry  
18 is as follows:

19 "July 18, 1944. (Clear.) Hottest weather  
20 of the year. Today's entry is on separate sheets.  
21 At 8:00 A.M. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me.  
22 Received report on the circumstances of the senior  
23 statesmen's conference at HIRANUMA's house. Mr. HIROSE,  
24 Hisatada, came and talked to me about the passing  
25 situation. Went to the office at 9:00 A.M.



1           "Was received in audience from 9:15 to 9:30.  
2   Reported to the Throne concerning the trend of the  
3   senior statesmen, principally about their meeting at  
4   HIRANUMA's residence. At 9:30 Premier TOGO proceeded  
5   to the Imperial Palace to be received in audience.  
6   Saw him and talked with him in the First Anteroom.  
7   The Premier revealed to me that he had decided on a  
8   resignation en bloc. Accordingly, I said that in  
9   order to carry out the political change smoothly, in  
10   view of the importance of the Army's position in the  
11   domestic picture, I should like to be informed, for  
12   my own information, of the succeeding prime minister,  
13   if he had one in mind. The Premier answered that the  
14   senior statesmen have a heavy responsibility for the  
15   present political change; therefore he supposed that  
16   they must have a plan in mind and he would not venture  
17   to give his opinions. However, in case a cabinet headed  
18   by an Imperial Prince were considered, he hoped that  
19   none of the Army royalty would be taken into consider-  
20   ation. Received in audience from 10:05 to 10:25.  
21   Reported among other things to the Emperor about the  
22   senior statesmen's conference, to be held following  
23   the resignation en bloc of the cabinet.  
24

25           "Was received in audience from 11:25 to 11:40  
and was shown the written resignation of TOJO and the

1 cabinet members.

2 "Went to work at 1:30. In response to a  
3 summons from His Majesty, had an audience from 4:00  
4 to 4:02. His Majesty asked me if HIRANUMA intended  
5 to form a cabinet. I replied that he probably did not.  
6 Then I went at once to the senior statesmen's confer-  
7 ence.

8 "The Details of the Senior Statesmen's  
9 Conference.

10 "Having been summoned by the Emperor, former  
11 Prime Minister WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, KONOYE,  
12 HIRANUMA, ABE and YONAI, President of the Privy Council  
13 HARA and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO met in  
14 conference at 4:00 P.M. on 18 July 1944. Discussion  
15 was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne  
16 as premier of the succeeding cabinet, Premier TOJO  
17 having tendered his resignation. The conference was  
18 closed at 8:45 P.M.

19 "Grand Chamberlain HYAKUTAKE, who attended  
20 the meeting in accordance with the Emperor's wish,  
21 notified those present of the import of the Imperial  
22 summons. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO gave a  
23 detailed explanation of the circumstance which had led  
24 to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet.

25 "The members then went into a discussion.



1 First of all, Mr. YONAI reported on how he had been  
2 asked by the cabinet to join it. His report was as  
3 follows:

4 "(1) At about 5:30 A.M. of the 13th Secretary  
5 AKAMATSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit  
6 me. He, however, did not come, but I do not know the  
7 reason.

8 "(2) On the 17th Finance Minister ISHIWATA  
9 called and urged me to join the cabinet. Chief of Naval  
10 Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged  
11 me to join the Cabinet, for the sake of the Navy. But  
12 I replied that it was unreasonable, that it might be a  
13 different matter if, for the sake of the Navy, I returned  
14 to active service in the Navy and became a member of  
15 the Supreme War Council, but I could be of no use by  
16 becoming a State Minister. I wrote a note to Mr. OKA  
17 saying, "After deep consideration, I have decided to  
18 reject the proposal," and thus indicated my decision.

19 "(3) A little past 9 P.M. on the 17th, SATO,  
20 Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, called on me.  
21 Navy Minister NOMURA was here also. They urged me by  
22 turns to join the Cabinet but in the end failed to  
23 make me change my mind.

24 "Then the discussion began, the important  
25 questions and answers being as follows:

"WAKATSUKI: What is the opinion of the Lord

1 Keeper of the Privy Seal?

2 "KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yet,  
3 but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it a good  
4 idea to consider the matter along the lines of the  
5 agreement made at the meeting at Baron HIRANUMA's  
6 residence?

7 "HARA: What meeting was that?

8 "WAKATSUKI: The senior statesmen met at  
9 Baron HIRANUMA's home, out of anxiety over the national  
10 situation. No special discussion occurred at the time  
11 concerning a new cabinet.

12 "ABE: Let me express my views to expedite  
13 the discussion. As a split between the state affairs  
14 and the Supreme Command will be dangerous, it is necess-  
15 ary that they keep in close contact. In short, I think  
16 a military man on the active list will be suitable at  
17 this time; and as the Navy plays the most important  
18 role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man  
19 should take up the premiership? For this reason, what  
20 do you say to asking Admiral YONAI to assume the duty?

21 "YONAI: In my opinion, the military man's  
22 original duty is to devote himself to the particular  
23 field of strategy and command, and it is most proper  
24 that the civil officials handle political affairs.  
25



1 It is wrong to appoint now from the Army and now from  
2 the Navy, like Genji and Heishi.

3 "ABE: That is not my idea.

4 "YONAI: If there is no suitable man among  
5 the civil officials, it will be between that an Army  
6 man assume the post. I would not be able to hold the  
7 position for a month, and, judging from my past exper-  
8 ience, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

9 "WAKATSUKI: For the purpose of discussion  
10 I suggest this as a tentative plan: I think a military  
11 man is preferable during wartime. At present we must  
12 rely upon the Navy as our first line of national defense.  
13 Hence, if any Navy man were to be suggested for the  
14 premiership, I wonder if he wouldn't feel scruples  
15 about taking it. Therefore, I think it is better that  
16 some one from the Army take the post. A premier should  
17 have political ability. In this sense, I think General  
18 UGAKI would be most competent, though I do not know the  
19 latest conditions. General ABE seemed to have an  
20 objection to the idea previously, but--

21 "ABE: I do not know how General UGAKI is  
22 getting along.  
23  
24  
25

1        "'YONAI: I understand the fact that the Navy  
2 stands at the forefront. After all, the Military  
3 should concentrate on warfare. The Military men have  
4 naturally received a one-sided education, and I be-  
5 lieve that it is for this very reason that they are  
6 strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitable  
7 for politics.

8        "'WAKATSUKI: Mr. YONAI's view is not without  
9 reason, but our country's practice is quite different  
10 from that of England and America. Also, our nation is  
11 not educated according to the same custom as that of  
12 America and Britain. It would be difficult for Japan  
13 to reach that point in one jump.

14        "'YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country  
15 will be done for.

16        "'KONOYE: If the military authorities themselves  
17 do not correct this point, the civilian officials cer-  
18 tainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taking  
19 the matter practically --/original illegible/ a mili-  
20 tary person would be better. A military man with such  
21 ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or  
22 Navy shall be decided by narrowing down the discussion.

23        "'KIDO: It short, it is a practical problem.  
24 Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried  
25 to reform the political system simultaneously it would be



1 impossible to do so. To think on two places at this  
2 time will obscure our objective.

3       "'HIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE.  
4 We are now at the stage where we must think of how to  
5 protect our national structure and the security of the  
6 Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions  
7 production alone could not be handled by anybody but  
8 a military man.

9       "'WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military  
10 person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

11       "'KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our  
12 process of selection.

13       "'YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging  
14 from my past experience as a premier.

15       "'WAKATSUKI: That was peacetime.  
16  
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1 "HARA: To be sure, my official position  
2 is such that I do not know how the political situa-  
3 tion stands. The present situation is so grave that  
4 the next cabinet will decide the fate of our country.  
5 It would be too much to place the full responsibility  
6 on a single military man alone. It should be a  
7 national cabinet influential and popular with the  
8 people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let  
9 about five men cooperate and accept the responsi-  
10 bility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a  
11 cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right.  
12 The Imperial command will fall upon the five men  
13 here and they, choosing the premier from among them-  
14 selves, will cooperate in administering state affairs.  
15 The situation is such that no one can undertake it.

16 "KIDO: I can well understand what Mr. HARA  
17 means. I don't suppose that any one objects so far,  
18 but I believe that the practical application would be  
19 very difficult.

20 "NAKATSUKI: Just as the Lord Keeper of the  
21 Privy Seal says, we should indicate one individual in  
22 replying, or His Majesty may have trouble.

23 "HIROTA: The situation may become such  
24 that a desperate act will become necessary. We must  
25 also think of the security of the Imperial family.



1 The new cabinet must be the highest and most powerful  
2 organization. At this time, should we not have a prince  
3 of the blood at the head of the new cabinet? I feel  
4 that a good number of army and navy general officers  
5 should closely assist the Emperor.

6 "PRINCE KONOYE: A cabinet of the Imperial  
7 family is not proper at the present stage.

8 HIRANUMA: I, too, think it not good, though  
9 the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

10 "YAMATSUKI: An Imperial family cabinet is  
11 not good.

12 "OKADA: The next cabinet should be a strong  
13 national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from  
14 home. It must fight out the war, and it must wage an  
15 impossible war. The question is how to make a real  
16 national cabinet.

17 "HARA: I think so too. One man cannot do  
18 it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall  
19 keep silence.

20 "OKADA: The next cabinet ought not be a cabi-  
21 net of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

22 "KIDO: I can well understand what you mean,  
23 but practically speaking what do you want to do?

24 "HARA: The cabinet should not belong to this  
25 man or that.

1           "'HIRANUMA: That is the very way I feel, but  
2 at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place.  
3 At the present state, it must be some one from the  
4 military. It goes without saying that the cabinet is  
5 under direct Imperial Rule.

6           "'WAKATSUKI: That is right.

7           "'OKADA: As far as this point is concerned,  
8 I am of the same opinion as YONAI. It might be best if  
9 the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who has a clear idea  
10 of the Emperor's wishes and of the home situation were  
11 to do it.

12           "'HARA: That will do because the ministers  
13 of war and navy will select both chiefs of general  
14 staff in the field of military command.

15           "'KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign  
16 situations, and especially the strengthening of home  
17 defense, I believe that the next premier should be an  
18 army man.

19           "'WAKATSUKI: Our answer to the Throne should  
20 not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will need  
21 further discussion.

22           "'ARE: In plain words then, it had been  
23 generally agreed that a military man is preferable.  
24 However, a man who is a military man alone is not  
25 enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out



1 warfare, civil officials and retired military men  
2 cannot keep satisfactory contact with military opera-  
3 tions. Navy men would be suitable for brightening up  
4 our nation.

5 "HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this  
6 time to form a real national cabinet, with a member of  
7 the Imperial family in the central post.

8 "WAKATSUKI: It is not good to impose politi-  
9 cal responsibility upon the Imperial family.

10 "KIDO: That is right.

11 "HIRANUMA: At this stage it's still not right.

12 "KONOYE: The same.

13 "KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the  
14 increase of army strength in the homeland and that of  
15 the military police require that we choose someone from  
16 the army.

17 "ABE: That will not renew the people's  
18 morale.

19 "WAKATSUKI: An army man seems better.

20 "YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at  
21 first, I think that an army man is best after all,  
22 having heard the explanation of the Lord Keeper of the  
23 Privy Seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion  
24 on this point.

25 "ABE: The army is unpopular. The nation's

1 trust in the navy is apparent.

2 "'HIRANUMA: At present there are two view-  
3 points prevalent among the people, and the army is on  
4 the unpopular side.

5 "'HIROTA: Does the Lord Keeper of the Privy  
6 Seal mean martial law by his previous explanation?

7 "'KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the  
8 stationing of army forces all over the country.

9 "'YONAI: How about Marshal TERAUCHI?

10 "'ABE: There is reason to think it would be  
11 difficult in practice.

12 "'HIRANUMA: It is not good to delay the  
13 formation of the cabinet at this time.

14 "'KONOYE: Why did the TOJO Cabinet fall? --  
15 Because it had declined in public favor. Therefore,  
16 the army must change its attitude in order to renew  
17 popular confidence.

18 "'HIRANUMA: The desire in all quarters is  
19 that the army stop interfering with them.

20 "'KONOYE: There has been leftist thoughts  
21 among some men in the army for more than ten years.  
22 Today there is an attempt to carry out a left-wing  
23 revolution through the cooperation of the military,  
24 the officials, and the people. This is more dangerous  
25 than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution



1 more than defeat, for even if defeated, we can main-  
2 tain the Imperial family and the national structure,  
3 but in case of a leftist revolution we cannot do so.  
4 From this viewpoint the selection of the War Minister  
5 is most important.

6 "YONAI: Judging from that point, an army  
7 man is better.

8 "WAKATSUKI: I've entertained doubts on  
9 that point for some time.

10 "HIRANUMA: So have I.

11 "KONOYE: Can TERAUCHI control that?

12 "ABE: He is a straightforward man, but in  
13 the first place to call him back from the front would  
14 be difficult.

15 "ABE: The next premier must be someone  
16 popular among the army.

17 "WAKATSUKI: Isn't UGAKI popular among the  
18 army?

19 "ABE: I do not know how popular he has been  
20 recently.

21 "YONAI: Mr. ABE, isn't there anyone who is  
22 popular?

23 "ABE: UMEZU is a man of character. There  
24 are a few others but they are all at the front and it  
25 will be difficult to call them back.

1       "'HIRANUMA: UMEZU is out of the question.  
2       Isn't there any other navy man?

3       "'YONAI: In view of what the Lord Keeper of  
4       the Privy Seal has said, it might be better to choose  
5       someone from the army.

6       "'HIRANUMA: Considerable experience would be  
7       needed to suppress the leftism referred to by Prince  
8       KONOYE.

9       "'KONOYE: There are some people who recommend  
10      Mr. SUZUKI, Kantaro.

11      "'YONAI: We had better not recommend him.

12      "'HIRANUMA: Putting aside individual reasons,  
13      I think it proper that he take the post for the sake  
14      of the state. I know him very well and think he is  
15      an honorable man.

16      "'YONAI: I said that from the standpoint of  
17      the nation's interest.

18      "'HIROTA: He seems to be a moderate person.

19      "'HIRANUMA: Though he is strong he is a man  
20      who can accept other people's opinions.

21      "'HARA: I know him very well, too, after  
22      working together with him in the Privy Council. Mr.  
23      SUZUKI has always said he will never take a political  
24      seat as he is a soldier. He has even said that even if  
25      commanded by His Majesty (T. N. to form a cabinet) he



1 would never accept it. I'm telling you this for  
2 reference.

3 "OKADA: As a man he is a fine person, but  
4 when I think of the soldiers at the front, I think an  
5 army man is better.

6 "HIROTA: I feel that we are in an important  
7 stage where we must reform the basis of the Japanese  
8 system. Everybody should be present at the Imperial  
9 Headquarters.

10 "HIRANUMA: In practice, this is impossible.

11 "HIROTA: As the prosecution of the war is  
12 first and foremost, as long as the four pillars of the  
13 army and the navy are firm, that is enough.

14 "KIDO: A man like Marshal TERAUCHI is one  
15 of them too.

16 "WAKATSUKI: Now that we are conferring, the  
17 people may feel uneasy unless the Imperial Command to  
18 form a cabinet is issued in a day or two. Therefore,  
19 I think we had better choose either UGAKI or General  
20 UMEZU.

21 "KIDO: How about Marshal HATA:

22 "KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an  
23 army man is to be recommended, it is a necessary con-  
24 dition that he make a change in the army so as to renew  
25 the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist

1 element. If UMEZU can do this, he may be all right.

2 "'HIRANUMA: Political experience is necessary.

3 "'KIDO: What is the comment at the front  
4 about Mr. UGAKI? As there is the enemy's propaganda  
5 offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's  
6 appointment causes discontent and unrest among the  
7 soldiers at the front.

8 "'ABE: Is the idea of a navy man in the  
9 minority?

10 "'ABE: If an army man is preferred, the  
11 next question is who?

12 "'KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about  
13 TERAUCHI or HATA?  
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1           "'ABE: The order may be (1) TERAUCHI, (2)  
2 UMEZU, and (3) HATA.

3           "'KIDO: As to UMEZU, the fact that he has  
4 only recently been appointed Chief of the Army General  
5 Staff and that he has had no ministerial career should  
6 be considered.

7           "'HIRANUMA: The next is YONAI, a Navy man.

8           "'KONOYE: There is also Mr. SUZUKI, Kantaro.

9           "'KONOYE: And what about the question of Mr.  
10 UGAKI?

11          "'HIRANUMA: I don't know about him lately.

12          "'KIDO: What other army generals are there  
13 besides these?

14          "'ABE: Well, there are HONJO, ARAKI, KOISO,  
15 and then there's TOJO.

16          "'KIDO: How about KOISO?

17          28YONAI: KOISO is a good man, capable and  
18 courageous.

19          "'KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGAKI's type but  
20 of smaller calibre?

21          "'ABE: Absolutely different.

22          "'KIDO: How does he get along with army men  
23 of the active list?

24          "'ABE: Not so badly, I believe. He is a  
25 different sort of man from TOJO.

1           "'HIRANUMA: He is a high calibre man and a  
2 pious one.

3           "'KIDO: What are his ideas?

4           "'WAKATSUKI: I have no objection, although  
5 I don't know him.

6           "'OKADA: KONOYE: We don't know him too well.  
7 What are the opinions of Mr. YONAI and Mr. HIRANUMA?  
8 He was a member of each of your cabinets.

9           "'HIROTA: No objection.

10          "'ABE: No objection.

11          "'OKADA: Now we must re-examine the question  
12 of whether KOISO can organize a truly national Cabinet.  
13 This is an extremely important time and, as we need not  
14 come to a final decision in one or two hours, I want to  
15 study the matter fully.

16          "'KIDO: I have in mind a plan to request the  
17 Emperor to call a conference of Senior Statesmen and  
18 Ministers in the Imperial Palace like the conferences  
19 of Elder Statesmen and Ministers of past years. I am  
20 now studying that matter.

21          "'OKADA: The formation of a cabinet requires  
22 careful thought.

23          "'HIROTA: How about a cabinet by direct Imperial  
24 order /Chokumei Naikaku/ or a coalition cabinet of Army  
25 and Navy?



1           "'WAKATSUKI: Actually there is a vice-premier  
2 in every cabinet.

3           "'KIDO: I must submit to the Throne Mr. HARA's  
4 opinion in detail.

5           "'KIDO: What is the order of the candidates?

6           "'WAKATSUKI: TERAUCHI, HATA, KOISO, and a  
7 Naval man.

8           "'HIRANUMA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA, and a naval  
9 man.

10           "'YONAI: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA. By the way  
11 when I recommended KOISO as a cabinet member before,  
12 the Emperor asked for the reason.

13           "'HIRANUMA: Speaking of KOISO I was asked by  
14 the Emperor about his connection with the UGAKI affair.

15           "'KONOYE: I don't know any of the three.

16           "'HIROTA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA.

17           "'ABE: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA.

18           "'OKADA: I don't know any of the three.

19           "'KIDO: I would like to have a meeting of the  
20 Senior Statesmen and the Imperial nominee in order that  
21 the former may support the latter.

22           "'WAKATSUKI: If they were to hamper the nominee,  
23 of course, it would be very bad, but if the nominee him-  
24 self wishes it, we will meet with pleasure.

25           "'KIDO: Thank you for taking part in this

1 long discussion. I will submit your opinions in  
2 detail to the Throne.  
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1        "The meeting being closed, I was immediately  
2 received in audience by the Emperor in his study from  
3 8:50 to 9:15. I reported the results of the con-  
4 ference in detail. I asked the Emperor to inquire  
5 of the Army High Command whether the appointment of  
6 Field Marshal TERAUCHI, the first candidate, would  
7 affect the military operations as he is the Supreme  
8 Commander of the Southern Area Army. The Emperor re-  
9 plied that he would have the Chief Aide-de-Camp ask  
10 the Chief of the General Staff TOJO (who happened to  
11 be at the palace for the installation ceremony for new  
12 Chief of the General Staff UMEZU). At 9:50 p.m., I  
13 was received in audience again. His Majesty told me  
14 as follows:

15        "Upon the Emperor's asking Chief of the General  
16 Staff TOJO as to the effect upon the military operations  
17 of Field Marshal TERAUCHI's appointment, the latter  
18 opposed the idea for the following two reasons. The  
19 Emperor thought them reasonable and has decided to  
20 appoint General KOISO.

21        "'1) When the enemy's counter-offensive is  
22 at its height, it is impossible to leave the post of  
23 front line Supreme Commander vacant even for a single  
24 day.  
25

      "'2) To allow the domestic political

1 situation to affect the front lines is bad for morale,  
2 and is certain to cause serious repercussions in the  
3 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as well as among  
4 neutral powers. Therefore, such a step must be avoided  
5 by all means.

6 "After asking the Emperor to summon the  
7 Grand Chamberlain and to order him to make arrangements  
8 for summoning General KOISO, I withdrew. I was sum-  
9 moned and was received in audience from 10:10 to  
10 10:25 p.m. The Emperor revealed to me his impression  
11 that judging from the line-up at the installation  
12 ceremony, TOJO might resume the post of War Minister  
13 after all and asked me if I didn't think so. I replied  
14 that I feared that it would have an unfavorable effect  
15 on the political situation. It was past eleven when  
16 I returned home and at last had dinner.'

17 "270. General KOISO, who was in Korea, was  
18 summoned by the Emperor to return to Tokyo and arrived  
19 in Tokyo on July 20, 1944 at 4:15 p.m. Meanwhile  
20 on July 19, 1944, as shown in my diary for that day --  
21 prosecution exhibit 1279 -- Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi, came  
22 to tell me about the political response created by  
23 the recommendation of General KOISO for premiership,  
24 but I do not retain an exact memory about his talk.  
25 If I remember correctly, however, he referred to a



1 considerable fear entertained as to whether or not  
2 it was possible for General KOISO to meet the situation  
3 successfully.

4 "The recommendation of General KOISO to the  
5 Throne was made upon the recommendation of the  
6 Conference of Senior Statesmen. This recommendation  
7 aroused fear in political circles as to the possibility  
8 of his tiding over the existing difficult situation.  
9 On the other hand, Prince KONOYE was of the opinion,  
10 if Admiral YONAI joined the cabinet, as he was most  
11 informed of the general situations, he might not only  
12 help toward solving the hotly discussed problem of  
13 unifying the Supreme Command between the army and  
14 navy, but also make it possible to establish the na-  
15 tional united front. Prince KONOYE told me Baron  
16 HIRANUMA had approved his idea. I had the same opinion  
17 and approved of it and requested Chief Secretary  
18 MATSUDAIRA to find out the views of the other senior  
19 statesmen.  
20

21 "271. The next day, July 20, 1944, as appears  
22 in my diary for that day, prosecution exhibit 1280,  
23 Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA reported to me the views  
24 of the senior statesmen. General ABE was the only one  
25 who disagreed to a KOISO-YONAI coalition cabinet. I  
reported to the Emperor and he approved of the coalition

1 cabinet. Later the Conference of Senior Statesmen  
2 reconvened at 4:00 p.m. and I explained the develop-  
3 ment regarding the coalition and they all concurred,  
4 General ABE withdrawing his disapproval. When General  
5 KOISO arrived at 4:15 I explained the situation to  
6 him leading to the resignation en bloc. General KOISO  
7 and Admiral YONAI received the Imperial mandate at  
8 5:10 as Premier and Deputy Premier respectively and  
9 as General KOISO only knew three of the senior states-  
10 men, it was also his wish to meet them all, which we  
11 did together with Admiral YONAI at 5:30.



1 "272. In addition to the conversation  
2 previously mentioned which I had with Foreign Minister  
3 SHIGEMITSU on June 26, 1944, about plans for peace,  
4 I had had others with him on July 6 and 15, 1944.  
5 Therefore, Mr. SHIGEMITSU's retention of the port-  
6 folio of Foreign Affairs in the KOISO Cabinet made me  
7 feel very much reassured. I was since in closer touch  
8 with the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU  
9 gave his most serious and earnest thought to Japan's  
10 mediation between Germany and the Soviet Union and  
11 the dispatch of special envoys to the Soviet Union  
12 and Germany. As in 1943, however, Germany refused to  
13 pay any attention to the question of peace with the  
14 Soviet Union, nor did the Soviet Union pay any attention  
15 to it. The opportunity was not ripe. The Soviet Union  
16 refused to approve the dispatch of special envoys from  
17 Japan to itself and Germany, because apparently it  
18 regarded the dispatch of special envoys as ballon  
19 d'essai for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.  
20 When Mr. SHIGEMITSU continued the portfolio of Foreign  
21 Affairs in the KOISO Cabinet I had further free and  
22 frank exchanges of views with him on the peace formula  
23 and other questions from time to time.

24 "273. On some occasions, I remember having  
25 heard from him that the Foreign Office received Allied

1 protests concerning Japan's treatment of prisoners of  
2 war through the Swiss Legation. Foreign Minister  
3 SHIGEMITSU later assured me that the Foreign Office  
4 immediately communicated with the Army, who reported  
5 later either that the reports were not true or that in  
6 some instances efforts were being made to ameliorate  
7 the situation. I took it for granted, therefore,  
8 that efforts were really being made to ameliorate the  
9 situation, as the Foreign Office's action was only  
10 too proper. SHIGEMITSU advised me that the military  
11 were not easy to deal with in regard to this and many  
12 other matters. In dealing with them it was necessary  
13 to use great tact and diplomacy rather than try to  
14 force matters. It was at this Tribunal that I heard  
15 detailed reports for the first time to my great  
16 astonishment.

17 "274. My diary reveals the number of talks  
18 we had about various matters and in many of these we  
19 discussed peace possibilities.

20 "July 27, 1944. At 9:30 a.m., Foreign  
21 Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my room, following his  
22 audience with the Emperor and had talks with me about  
23 the European situation.'

24 "August 21, 1944. At 2:30 p.m., Foreign  
25 Minister SHIGEMITSU called on me to have talks with



1 me, mostly about the question of peace between Germany  
2 and the Soviet Union.'

3 "'August 24, 1944. At 4:00 p.m., Foreign  
4 Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my room after his audience  
5 with the Emperor and had talks with me about the  
6 armistice between the Soviet Union and Rumania.'

7 "'August 31, 1944. At 4:15 p.m., Foreign  
8 Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the palace and was  
9 received in audience, when he reported to His Majesty  
10 on the sounding of the attitude of Germany and the  
11 Soviet Union toward peace and Rumania's armistice  
12 with the Soviet Union. Following his withdrawal from  
13 the Imperial presence, he came to my room to have talks  
14 with me.'

15 "'September 5, 1944. At 1:30 p.m., Foreign  
16 Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the Palace and was  
17 received in audience. Following his withdrawal from  
18 the Imperial presence, he came to my room when I had  
19 talks with him mostly about the worsening of the  
20 European situation.'

21 "'September 19, 1944. At 4:00 p.m. Foreign  
22 Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the Palace and was  
23 received in audience by the Emperor when he reported  
24 to His Majesty on the Soviet Union's attitude toward  
25 the dispatch of special envoys. Following his

1 withdrawal from the Imperial presence, he came to my  
2 room when I had talks with him.'

3 "'September 25, 1944. At 2:30 p.m., Foreign  
4 Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the Palace and was  
5 received in audience by the Emperor. Following his  
6 withdrawal from the Imperial presence, I had an inter-  
7 view with him.'

8 "'September 26, 1944. Shortly after 4:00  
9 p.m., I had talks with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU at  
10 my official residence about the outlook on the war and  
11 other questions. It reminded me of much difficulty  
12 ahead.'

13 "'October 7, 1944. At 4:30 p.m., Foreign  
14 Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the Palace and was  
15 received in audience by the Emperor. Following his  
16 withdrawal from the Imperial presence, he came to my  
17 room to have talks with me.'

18 "'October 15, 1944. On the way back to office,  
19 I went to my official residence, where I had talks with  
20 Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about the outlook on the  
21 war and other matters.'

22 "'November 15, 1944. After his audience with  
23 the Emperor, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU called on me  
24 when I had talks with him.'

25 "275. Before dwelling on the organized efforts



1 put forth after the formation of the SUZUKI Cabinet,  
2 the successor to the KOISO Cabinet, let me refer to  
3 His Majesty's mental attitude and the senior states-  
4 men's movements prior to that. Early in 1944, when  
5 the war situation steadily developed against Japan  
6 with no optimism warranted for the future, many of  
7 the intellectual classes felt deep concern over the  
8 future of the country. Messrs. KONOYE, HIRANUMA,  
9 WAKATSUKI, and OKADA of the Senior Statesmen usually  
10 met once in a month to have a free and frank exchange  
11 of views on current topics. And the central one of  
12 them was how to terminate hostilities. Admiral OKADA  
13 told Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA about their meeting  
14 every time it took place. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA  
15 in his turn told me all about it. From time to time,  
16 Prince KONOYE too told me about it, and I shared the  
17 Senior Statesmen's deep concern.

18 "276. On January 6, 1945, the enemy pene-  
19 trated into Lingayen Bay, it was reported. The war  
20 situation of the Philippine Islands became very grave.  
21 The Emperor asked me if it was not necessary to seek  
22 the Senior Statesmen's views in accordance with the  
23 developments of the war situation. I advised him that  
24 he should consult the chiefs of the Army and Navy  
25 General Staffs, then members of the Cabinet and then

1 if it is recognized as necessary 'to determine the  
2 highest policy,' an Imperial council of Senior States-  
3 men and the Cabinet should be convened. By this I was  
4 paving the way for peace in that the 'highest policy'  
5 referred to meant 'decision for peace'. My diary for  
6 that day records this counsel I gave:

7 "January 6, 1945. From 2:45 to 3:05 p.m.,  
8 I was received in audience by the Emperor in the  
9 Gobunko and H.M. told me as follows: He had been  
10 informed that the American Army had begun to force  
11 their way into Luzon. The battle in the Philippines  
12 has become all the more critical, and its result might  
13 make it necessary for him to consult the senior states-  
14 men. H.M. asked me what I thought. In reply to the  
15 above, I said something to the following effect: As  
16 H.M. says, I myself, too, think the battle in the  
17 Philippines has become quite critical and its ultimate  
18 result might become such that the circumstances which  
19 led to this must be considered seriously in view of the  
20 future guidance of the war. His Majesty must necessarily  
21 observe the transition of the war situation for the time  
22 being and know the true resolutions of the chiefs of  
23 both the Imperial General Staff and Naval General Staff  
24 who are taking a leading part in the war. So how would  
25 it be if His Majesty calls both Chiefs at the same time



1 and exchange real frank opinions with them in contrast  
2 to the conventional audience which is apt to be formal.  
3 After that, His Majesty could call the members of the  
4 Cabinet concerned and inquire, in detail, and if it is  
5 recognized that it is necessary to determine the high-  
6 est policy, then it would be better to hold an Imperial  
7 Council of ex-premiers and Cabinet Ministers. At any  
8 rate, I wish that His Majesty would observe the tran-  
9 sition of the situation for a few days.'

10 "277. On January 13, 1945, His Majesty again  
11 referred to a meeting with the Senior Statesmen after  
12 making an observation to me on the situation in the  
13 Philippines and French Indo-China. I advised him I  
14 would study these matters. I had been giving the  
15 question of how the Emperor could obtain the opinion of  
16 the Senior Statesmen serious thought. A meeting with  
17 them at this was fraught with danger if the military  
18 found out about it. My diary for that day is as follows:

19 "January 13, 1945. From 10:35 to 11:15 I was  
20 received in audience by the Emperor in the Gobunko. He  
21 told me of his opinions on the war situation in the  
22 Philippines and of the attacks on the French Indo-China  
23 coast by an enemy task force and even referred to the  
24 senior statesmen. So I replied that I would study these  
25 matters seriously.'

1 "278. In addition to the fact that the Emper-  
2 or was greatly concerned over the situation, the Senior  
3 Statesmen, including Prince KONOYE shared Imperial  
4 solicitude. Therefore, I could not in conscience,  
5 look on with folded arms. I had to do something.  
6 After consulting Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, Minister of  
7 the Imperial Household, I made arrangements that the  
8 Senior Statesmen be received in audience separately  
9 by the Emperor to submit to His Majesty their views  
10 on the current difficult situation. This would pre-  
11 vent suspicion by the Military. The plan was report-  
12 ed to the Emperor, who sanctioned it February 1, 1945.  
13 My diary for that day is as follows:

14 "February 1, 1945. At 9 a. m. received treat-  
15 ment from Mr. HAYAKAWA.

16 "At 11:30 asked Vice-Minister SHIRANE to come  
17 to my room and requested him to obtain the consent of  
18 the Minister of the Imperial Household (now indisposed  
19 with a cold) concerning the proposed audience of the  
20 Senior Statesmen in the form of paying their respect  
21 to His Majesty. At 1 p. m. called on the Grand Chamber-  
22 lain at his room to consult about the same matter.  
23 Was received in audience by the Emperor from 1:35 to  
24 2:10 at the Gobunko and reported to him about the  
25 audience of the Senior Statesmen in the form of paying



1 respect to His Majesty and my attendance at the OMIYA  
2 GOSHO (The Palace of the Empress Dowager).'

3 "279. In accordance with my idea, the Senior  
4 Statesmen individually held audiences with the Emperor  
5 to express their views, as follows: Baron HIRANUMA,  
6 February 7, 1945; HIROTA, February 9, 1945; Prince  
7 KONOYE February 14, 1945; Baron WAKATSUKI, February  
8 19, 1945; Admiral OKADA, February 23, 1945; and  
9 General TOJO, February 26, 1945. In addition I  
10 arranged for Count MAKINO to have an audience and he  
11 did so on February 19, 1945. The fact that these  
12 audiences were held appears in my diary of these dates.  
13 General ABU was in Korea at this time, General KOISO  
14 was Premier and Admiral YONAI was Vice Premier.

15 "280. After these audiences I had a further  
16 talk with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about the pros-  
17 pects of an early peace. My diary for March 8, 1945,  
18 records this conversation.

19 "March 8, 1945. At 4:00 p. m. Foreign Minis-  
20 ter SHIGEMITSU called on me when I had an exchange of  
21 views with him on the outlook on the war and the line-  
22 up of those close to the Throne."

23 "281. Meanwhile, the KOISO Cabinet was taking  
24 moves on Chungking for the purpose of settling the  
25 China affair. In other words, it was planning to open

1 negotiations direct with Chiang Kai-shek. Early in  
2 September, 1944, the plan was referred to the Supreme  
3 Council for Direction of War, which decided on the  
4 guiding principle for the purpose. But no tangible  
5 result was produced. In March, 1945, Prime Minister  
6 KOISO dispatched Colonel YANAGAWA to China to invite  
7 Mr. Liao Pin to Japan for the purpose of opening  
8 direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek through the  
9 letter. Now, by that time, the Philippine Islands and  
10 Iwojima Island had been almost captured by the enemy.  
11 The adverse turn of the war situation against Japan  
12 must have been fully known to Chungking. It was be-  
13 yond conception that China, who had been entirely de-  
14 pendent upon America and Britain should make peace  
15 separately with Japan without consulting them. Further,  
16 judging by his record, Mr. Liao Pin himself was said to  
17 be not fully reliable. In consequence, Foreign Minis-  
18 ter SHIGEMITSU, War Minister SUGIYAMA, Navy Minister  
19 YONAI and General UMEZU, Chief of Staff of the Army,  
20 were opposed to the projected peace moves toward Chung-  
21 king either as leaders of the Government or members of  
22 the High Command. But Prime Minister KOISO was very  
23 enthusiastic and on April 2, 1945, proceeded to the  
24 palace and reported to the Throne on his plan for direc-  
25 tion peace negotiation with Chungking through the



1 intermediary of Mr. Liao Pin. The Emperor referred  
2 the matter to the Three Ministers of War, the Navy  
3 and Foreign Affairs, as the result of which it was  
4 ascertained that the opportunity was not ripe yet.  
5 Therefore, the matter was dropped. In order to cope  
6 with a sudden deterioration of war situation, Prime  
7 Minister KOISO sought his reinstatement in active ser-  
8 vice and his concurrent appointment as War Minister  
9 for the purpose of redoubling his efforts for the  
10 prosecution of the war, but his plan failed to mater-  
11 ialize, due to the Army authorities' objection. This  
12 and other reasons were responsible for the collapse of  
13 the KOISO Cabinet."

14 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
15 minutes.

16 (Thereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
17 taken until 1100, after which the proceed-  
18 ings were resumed as follows:)  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

4 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I wish  
5 to object to the last 7 lines of paragraph 281 as a  
6 conclusion of the witness and ask that that be stricken.  
7 I make this statement on behalf of General KOISO,  
8 because we wish to adopt the affidavit with the con-  
9 clusions as referred to stricken.

10 THE PRESIDENT: We admitted this affidavit  
11 two days ago. Nobody objected. Mr. Keenan had some  
12 kind of objection, but nobody else.

13 MR. BROOKS: I thought, if your Honors please --

14 THE PRESIDENT: There is quite a lot of  
15 objectionable matter in this, Captain Brooks, and we  
16 have taken note of your objection to these particular  
17 lines.

18 MR. BROOKS: I make this statement, your Honor,  
19 because I thought that the counsel at the lectern would  
20 drop opinions and conclusions from this affidavit from  
21 time to time, and I was calling it to his attention.  
22 He may be willing to withdraw that part.

23 THE PRESIDENT: We left to Mr. Logan's judgment  
24 what he should read. We said so.

25 MR. LOGAN: I shall continue reading the



1 affidavit, page 248, paragraph 282:

2 "282. On April 4, 1945 Premier KOISO told me  
3 that he intended to resign. In addition to a written  
4 report which he gave me, he explained his reasons. Both  
5 his oral explanation and written report are set forth  
6 in my diary for that day, prosecution exhibit 1281 as  
7 corrected by the Language Section, record, page 11, 941.  
8 No opinion of mine is set forth in this exhibit as I  
9 expressed none to him. At that time, feeling the  
10 imperative necessity of taking immediate steps to end  
11 the war, I considered this a golden opportunity and one  
12 which should not be lost. I had previously made known  
13 to the Chief Aide-de-Camp that day my intentions in the  
14 event of a cabinet change, which appeared imminent, to  
15 meet with the two Chiefs of Staffs as well as with the  
16 two Ministers, War and Navy, to find out what the Supreme  
17 Command was thinking. When Premier KOISO later mentioned  
18 that he thought an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet should  
19 be formed, I seized this opportunity to request permission  
20 from His Majesty that I would like to see the Minister  
21 of Army and Navy and the two Chiefs of Staff, prior  
22 to the Senior Statesmen's Conference. This, and the  
23 Emperor's permission to do so appears in exhibit 1281  
24 as corrected. By Imperial Headquarters Cabinet is  
25 meant a cabinet in which the Premier assumes the power

1 of the Chiefs of Staff to direct the conduct of the War.

2 "283. The next morning April 5, 1944, Premier  
3 KOISO resigned at 10:30 a.m. I was later summoned in  
4 audience and shown his resignation. As previously  
5 arranged I conferred with Chief of the Army General  
6 Staff UMEZU at 11:35 a.m., Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55  
7 a.m., War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1 p.m. and Chief of the  
8 Naval General Staff OIKAWA at 2 p.m. This, and the  
9 reports I received from each of them appears in  
10 prosecution exhibit 1282 as corrected, record page  
11 11,351, 16,195, my diary of that day. Of these reports  
12 the prosecution only read General UMEZU's. Prosecution's  
13 summary, document 0001, page 316 of UMEZU's report is  
14 wrong. UMEZU did not stress the 'need of a special  
15 cabinet.' As shown in the exhibit, UMEZU doubted the  
16 practicability of a special cabinet (Imperial Headquarter's  
17 Cabinet) saying it was worth considering but 'it is diff-  
18 icult to link together the supreme command and state  
19 affairs.' No opinion of mine is expressed in any of  
20 these reports. As the result of these conversations,  
21 I ascertained that all of them were generally opposed  
22 to a change of the Cabinet's character, holding that a  
23 clear line of demarcation be drawn between the High  
24 Command and the conduct of State affairs by the Governmen  
25 as done in the past. And it was highly problematical



1 in the light of the situation then prevailing, whether  
2 the adverse war situation would be retrieved even  
3 if a new cabinet was formed under General KOISO's  
4 conception. Further, judging by the actual home situation,  
5 that is, the people's war weariness and emasculation  
6 as well as the acute food situation, the country could  
7 not afford to make such a trial. The vital necessity for  
8 effecting a drastic reorientation was driven home to me,  
9 so that I thought it dangerous to translate into  
10 practice Prime Minister KOISO's idea. When I talked  
11 with Admiral YONAI, I asked his opinion about a successor  
12 to Premier KOISO. He approved Admiral SUZUKI as shown  
13 in my diary. The reason I asked YONAI his opinion at  
14 this time was because although he was a Senior Statesman,  
15 he would be unable to be present at the coming Senior  
16 Statesmen's conference because he was Navy Minister of  
17 the outgoing Cabinet.  
18

19 "284. With such a frame of mind, I attended  
20 the Conference of Senior Statesmen at 5 p.m. that day.  
21 They, too, opposed an Imperial Headquarter's Cabinet.  
22 It was contended on that occasion that a man free from  
23 any commitment in the past or a man with iron nerves,  
24 capable of taking a long-range view of the situation be  
25 selected this time as succeeding Prime Minister and also  
that choice be not necessarily limited to a general or

1 admiral in active service. But General TOJO was the  
2 only exception among the conferees. He contended that  
3 Marshal HATA be chosen as succeeding Prime Minister on  
4 the ground that the war situation had entered upon a  
5 state in which a decisive battle would have to be  
6 fought in the Japanese mainland and therefore, that the  
7 next Prime Minister must be a general or admiral in  
8 active service. Whereupon, I stated that if a decisive  
9 battle was to be fought in the Japanese mainland, it  
10 would be political power behind the gun that counted,  
11 as it would involve millions of innocents in its wake.  
12 Pointing out the Army's extreme unpopularity among the  
13 people, I said that it would be better to choose a non-  
14 Army man. General TOJO would not yield. On the contrary,  
15 he went the length of saying that if such a thing was  
16 done, the Army might look the other way (meaning a coup  
17 d'etat by the Army). I retorted that the nation would  
18 look the other way if an army man was chosen. It was  
19 quite 'a scene.' No conferee touched upon peace moves  
20 explicitly for fear that in view of General TOJO's  
21 presence at the conference, any tactless remark might  
22 stimulate the Army to an unscrupulous countermeasure.  
23 But all conferees except General TOJO had a tacit under-  
24 standing on this point, which was given expression in  
25 their desires for 'a man free from any commitment in



1 the past,' as expressed by KONOYE and HIRANUMA. Baron  
2 SUZUKI said that he would like to decline the offer  
3 as Premier as he had hitherto professed never to take  
4 part in politics.  
5

6 "285. Prosecution exhibit 1282 as corrected  
7 purports to include the full proceedings of the Senior  
8 Statesmen's Conference held on April 5, 1945. But it  
9 omits part of the conference and none of the proceedings  
10 has been read to the Tribunal. The sketchy summary of  
11 this Conference (prosecution document 0001, page 311)  
12 creates an erroneous impression. The full proceeding  
13 is as follows:

14 "The meeting of Senior Statesmen was held in  
15 the reception room from 5:00 p.m. on 5 April 1945.

16 "KONOYE, HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, HIROTA, KIDO, WAKAT-  
17 SUKI, OKADA, TOJO (Baron WAKATSUKI attended from 6 o'clock)

18 "The Grand Chamberlain made formal address --  
19 the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal explained the situation  
20 leading to the political change and after reading KOISO's  
21 resignation, passed it around.  
22

23 "TOJO: The resignation states that both the  
24 state affairs and supreme command require revision. What  
25 is the meaning /of this statement/?

"KIDO: There was no particular explanation  
given by Premier KOISO.

1           "TOJO: Frequent changing of cabinets in war  
2 time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference  
3 on April 25 is especially the most important period.  
4 The cabinet to be formed should be the final one. With-  
5 in the country at present, there exists, on one hand,  
6 the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide  
7 for future developments of the country and on the other  
8 hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender  
9 terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is  
10 necessary to decide on this first.

11           "OKADA: The new cabinet to be formed must  
12 consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet  
13 that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the  
14 very end and a cabinet that will solidly combine the  
15 total power of the country. Such a problem as war or  
16 peace can be determined only at a later stage. I believe  
17 we must first carefully study these problems before  
18 determining this question.  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



1           "HIRANUMA: As their Excellencies have said,  
2 the acute war situation today has given rise to various  
3 opinions which must be unified. There is no way out  
4 but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is  
5 simple. Frankly, I am bewildered because of this  
6 sudden political change and it would have been desir-  
7 able not to have replied to the Throne immediately as  
8 in previous cases. I wish we could also have heard  
9 carefully, if possible, the opinions of Ministers  
10 KOISO and YONAI, but since the resignations have been  
11 tendered, it is too late. Frankly, since my opinions  
12 are being presented without any preparation, I do not  
13 have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I  
14 suggest that we carefully discuss such problems as  
15 their Excellencies have presented.

17           "KIDO: I am quite of the same opinion. The  
18 fact is that for a time it appeared as if a total  
19 resignation would occur, but I heard thereafter that  
20 it was changed to the policy of reorganizing, and both  
21 Field Marshals SUGIYAMA and HATA were to be trans-  
22 ferred to the posts of Commanders-in-Chief of the  
23 General Defence Commands. Accompanying this, it be-  
24 came necessary to change the War Minister, and there-  
25 fore the Army offered to the cabinet General ANAMI  
as its successor. Premier KOISO states that to effect

1 reorganization now and then to execute a total resigna-  
2 tion a little later on would be betraying the Army.  
3 (personally I do not know what is meant by this). So  
4 that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is  
5 really so sudden, and I myself am much perplexed.

6 "OKADA: Before giving out names, how about  
7 discussing the total power concentration and powerful  
8 cabinet?

9 "HIRANUMA: Formerly, the Premier was first  
10 of all decided, and that Premier was to recommend the  
11 ministers for the portfolio to the Throne. But at this  
12 time if the principal ministers are not decided, the  
13 cabinet will not become powerful. If we adhere to the  
14 conventional way on Army, Navy Peace Preservation, etc.,  
15 we shall reach no conclusion.

16 "TOJO: If we decide the cabinet ministers,  
17 then doesn't it mean that the Emperor is to bear the  
18 responsibilities after the formation?

19 "HIRANUMA: It would not be right for the  
20 Emperor to give orders directly.

21 "TOJO: Avoid having the good and bad of the  
22 cabinet formation falling back on the Emperor.

23 "HIRANUMA: From the point of formalities, it  
24 is as you say, but what I meant to say was that how  
25 about deciding it after soliciting our opinions a little



1 more?

2           "'HIROTA: We must win by any means. Although  
3 there are pessimistic views, in this current war, no  
4 country has so far been winning straight through from  
5 the start. All of them have been, one time or another,  
6 on the verge of being defeated and have rallied back  
7 again. The next cabinet should be one that would  
8 fight through to win the war. I think it was really  
9 an appropriate action of the Lord Keeper of the Privy  
10 Seal to have interviewed the leaders of the Army and  
11 Navy authorities, but don't you think that it is  
12 necessary to ascertain the intentions of the Army and  
13 Navy authorities a little more?

14           "'KIDO: I did ask them considerably but there  
15 was no special opinions expressed.

16           "'HIRANUMA: Speaking outright, Mr. KOISO's  
17 cabinet formation was a failure. He should have con-  
18 sulted us a little more. The reorganization, if speak-  
19 ing candidly, was a failure. Speaking of formalities,  
20 it is as His Excellency TOJO said, but in actuality, he  
21 should have consulted us a little more without being  
22 apprehended by theories.

23           "'KIDO: It is as you say. In the case of the  
24 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, too, after he has made  
25 his recommendation, he is to keep his mouth shut regard-

1 ing the formation of the cabinet. And when it does not  
2 go well, he is criticized on the score of his respon-  
3 sibility for recommending. It is really a curious  
4 system. I believe this ought to be corrected, but  
5 only we are compelled to continue the practice in the  
6 absence of no other formula.'

7 "(The exhibit as corrected does not accurate-  
8 ly set forth what I said. The foregoing paragraph  
9 more accurately sets forth my statement. I am merely  
10 referring to the fact that the public often criticized  
11 my recommendation of a new Prime Minister, which was  
12 my responsibility to the Throne, if the Cabinet failed,  
13 yet I had no voice in the selection of the Cabinet  
14 members.)

15 "Continuing the exhibit:

16 "'HIRANUMA: I think that it is unreasonable  
17 that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord  
18 Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, and that we must share  
19 the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is  
20 best that the one who organizes a cabinet should seek  
21 more advice.

22 "'OKADA: Some people say that considerable  
23 surplus power still exists in our country and ask why  
24 we do not utilize this potential fighting power. Be-  
25 fore amassing the total power of military officials,



1 government officials, and civilians, unity among the  
2 leaders is strongly desired. It is necessary that we  
3 study as to whether the procedure we have followed  
4 until today is right or wrong.

5 "HIRANUMA: After the decision is made in  
6 this room and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes  
7 an informal report to the Throne, a situation would  
8 develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him  
9 to do as he pleases, I wonder.

10 "KONOYE: Although you are right, the problem  
11 is in what form it should be carried out.

12 "KIDO: There are many who desire a firmer  
13 unity among the leaders.

14 "HIRANUMA: Setting aside discussions from the  
15 legislative and constitutional standpoints, I think  
16 it is better to have closer contact in the organization  
17 of the cabinet since the responsibility must be assumed.

18 "OKADA: I agree.

19 "SUZUKI: I think that there is no necessity  
20 of fixing a limit on the scope of the Emperor's summons.  
21 I would like to ask the opinion of the Lord Keeper of  
22 the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that whenever  
23 the occasion demanded, Prince SAIONJI sought the advices  
24 of Count YAMAMOTO and Fleet Admiral TOGO. After obtain-  
25 ing the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views

1 of Count MAKINO?

2 "KIDO: You are right. But the procedure  
3 nowadays is different from the days of Prince SAIONJI.  
4 The procedure has been decided upon in accordance with  
5 His Majesty's desire that the membership of the confer-  
6 ence should consist of those who, enjoying the full  
7 confidence of His Majesty, had taken the reins of  
8 government at least once. It will be impossible to  
9 request for Count MAKINO's participation here now.'

10 "(The foregoing paragraph is complete - Prosecu-  
11 tion's exhibit states some Japanese characters illegible.)

12 "Continuing the exhibit:

13 "'HIROTA: Unification in the upper classes is  
14 indeed most necessary, and I think that it would be  
15 better to have such person as Count MAKINO participate.  
16 In the case the cabinet changes, will the Supreme War  
17 Guidance Council still continue? And speaking of the  
18 Premier attending Imperial General Headquarters, was  
19 this permitted only to KOISO or that hereafter the  
20 Prime Minister will always be able to attend it?

21 "KIDO: At present there are opinions that  
22 since the Premier attends the Imperial General Head-  
23 quarters, the Supreme War Guidance Council is unnecessary.  
24 This is a problem that should be considered in future.  
25 The next question is that although I do not know the



1 details, I think that hereafter the Premier will be  
2 able to attend the Imperial General Headquarters.

3 "TOJO: The Premier will attend as a partici-  
4 pator in the war council, and will witness the manipula-  
5 tion of troops in national defense.

1           "'SUZUKI: Although I can understand the  
2 case of Count MAKINO by your explanation, I dare say  
3 that only when we include him the scope will not be-  
4 come obscure but that I think there is no other qual-  
5 ified person similar to Count MAKINO.

6           "'WAKATSUKI: I don't understand the purport  
7 of the resignation. It is a very queer resignation  
8 to explain the character of the forthcoming cabinet.

9           "'KONOYE: Since the case was so sudden, I  
10 have no idea. I think that, in regard to the opinion  
11 of His Excellency TOJO, it cannot be decided at this  
12 stage when the Supreme Command is not represented here.  
13 At this meeting, as at the time of the last meeting,  
14 first of all, how about gradually limiting the field  
15 /in choosing the Premier/ whether it must be from the  
16 military circles, and whether it will be from the Army  
17 or from the Navy.

18           "'TOJO: I do not mean to say that the premiers  
19 should be decided at this meeting. I meant that it  
20 should be submitted as a material to His Majesty so  
21 that he can prepare himself.

22           "'WAKATSUKI: The purport of His Imperial  
23 summons was to have us choose the Premier for the suc-  
24 ceeding cabinet, and I believe it is against His Im-  
25 perial will to discuss on things which TOJO mentioned.



1 To discuss whether we should fight the war to the last  
2 or whether we should seek peace halfway is an out of  
3 the way question. I think it goes too far.

4 "SUZUKI: According to Mr. WAKATSUKI's  
5 opinion, we must now fight this war to its bitter end.  
6 I think this problem must be settled first. Therefore,  
7 if the leader of the succeeding cabinet does not pos-  
8 sess this will, I think he is unsuitable.

9 "WAKATSUKI: I thought I was requested to  
10 state my opinion regarding this.

11 "TOJO: It is not so. It is meant to be  
12 merely an assumption.

13 "KIDO: Today when the situation is such  
14 that the homeland is about to be a battlefield, the  
15 actual national conditions give rise for grave concern.  
16 The public does not always cooperate earnestly with the  
17 measures taken by the government. A large number tend  
18 to be indifferent. Viewed from the food problem, pro-  
19 duction increase problem and peace preservation prob-  
20 lem, the incoming cabinet must be one that will place  
21 confidence in the people. Of late, anti-militarism  
22 tendencies have appeared substantially and I think this  
23 also must be given careful attention.

24 "HIRANUMA: The basic idea is that ominent  
25 subjects of the state should be held responsible to

1 the Throne.

2 "WAKATSUKI: Twenty years have already  
3 elapsed since I had once been a premier, so I have no  
4 knowledge of the present men. I really sense deep  
5 trepidation in feeling incapable of fulfilling my  
6 duty. I am willing to take all responsibility but  
7 in regards to this duty, I believe that I am most un-  
8 suitable. I request that the system itself also be  
9 given consideration.

10 "If the opinions of Baron HIRANUMA should be  
11 adopted, (select principle cabinet members beforehand)  
12 nobody will be willing to accept the premiership and  
13 it will not be possible to form a cabinet. It will  
14 thoroughly restrict the activities of the premier. I  
15 cannot express my opinions as to whether the purport  
16 of Premier KOISO's resignation could be carried out  
17 or not.

18 "KONOYE: On the previous occasion the matter  
19 of state affairs and supreme command was also the focus  
20 of consideration. For this purpose, a military man was  
21 thought to be most appropriate and was decided after  
22 boiling down the issue. Would it not be better to use  
23 the same process?

24 "WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasions I  
25 was the one that suggested it but the purport of his



1 resignation is different.

2       "'KIDO: This resignation is but an expression  
3 of Premier KOISO's opinion, and it does not necessarily  
4 mean that we should stick to this.

5       "'HIROTA: It is better to have either the  
6 War Minister or the Navy Minister be the chief of the  
7 new cabinet.

8       "'HIRANUMA: There are two phases of opinion  
9 at home in regard to the conclusion of the war. At  
10 this time we must have a person who will fight it out.  
11 We cannot recommend any peace advocator who favors  
12 cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choos-  
13 ing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally,  
14 I am unable to voice any opinion if it means that all  
15 we have to do is to appoint the Premier and the rest  
16 to be left to him. I am strongly opposed for peace  
17 and cessation of hostilities. From the point of for-  
18 malities, it is as what Mr. WAKATSUKI stated, but  
19 actually, they are inseparable.  
20

21       "'In the manifestation of the whole national  
22 strength influential persons from the civilian populace  
23 must be employed.

24       "'KIDO: We must formulate a system whereby  
25 the people will follow us.

      "'HIRANUMA: Viewed from the relations between

1 state affairs and supreme command, do you mean that  
2 the Premier must be a soldier in active military  
3 service?

4 "HIROTA: After all, difficult situations  
5 may arise if the Premier was not a soldier of the  
6 active military service, but that is not always nec-  
7 essary if he is authorized to present himself at the  
8 Imperial General Headquarters.

9 "HIRANUMA: At the least, he must be in the  
10 first or second reserve.

11 "SUZUKI: At the time of the Sino-Japanese  
12 War we have Premier ITO. The Premier need not always  
13 be a soldier.

14 "HIRANUMA: Practically speaking, the Premier  
15 will not understand war, unless he was a soldier at  
16 least in the first or second reserve. Nevertheless,  
17 the premise is that, if it is to be fought, it must be  
18 fought out.

19 "OKADA: Through the conversations carried  
20 until now, it seems that the character of the Premier,  
21 in general, is distinctive.

22 "KONOYE: Then we may conclude that he must  
23 be a soldier either in the first or second reserve who  
24 will fight it out.

25 "HIRANUMA: I hope no one will say that it



1 is improper at this time, such as said by Mr. WAKATSUKI..

2       "'WAKATSUKI: Actually, I am unqualified -- I  
3 fear that I may say something thoughtless. The question  
4 is not of a man who will fight it out to a final victory.  
5 If we propose peace now, it will evidently lead to un-  
6 conditional surrender.

7       "'HIRANUMA: From the relations between supreme  
8 command and state affairs, I think we need a man from  
9 the Army or Navy, but not necessarily in active service.

10       "'WAKATSUKI: The fundamental principle has  
11 been clarified but how about its application?

12       "'HIRANUMA: What is Prince KONOYE's opinion?

13       "'KONOYE: A person that has no connection  
14 hitherto should be recommended.

15       "'HIRANUMA: It must be necessary that the per-  
16 son has had no connection and that he can be relied upon  
17 as seen from the public and people.

18       "'WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, it was  
19 decided to be from the Army and although a certain  
20 person was named, he was not selected. Today, it can  
21 be either from the Army or Navy. What is your opinion,  
22 Mr. OKADA?

23       "'OKADA: My mental vision is also narrow but  
24 gathered here are men from a wide field, so a competent  
25 man can be selected.

1           "'WAKATSUKI: Does the Lord Keeper of the  
2 Privy Seal approve of this measure?

3           "'KIDO: Yes.

4           "'WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion?

5           "'KIDO: In the first place, since it is  
6 my duty here to listen to your opinions, I wish you  
7 would state your unreserved opinions. What is your  
8 opinion, Mr. SUZUKI?



1           "SUZUKI: How would it be if the hitherto  
2 senior statesmen make an effort? We have the respon-  
3 sibility and are prepared to die for the country. The  
4 resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessary.  
5 Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand  
6 the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the young-  
7 est. After that we all will try. How about the  
8 four trying first? I have heard that previously  
9 President (of the Privy Council) HARA also made this  
10 suggestion. A week before the former President (of  
11 the Privy Council) died, I intimately heard him talk  
12 on this subject and I recall being greatly impressed.  
13 I suggest he accept by all means.

14           "KONOYE: Then it differs from aforemen-  
15 tioned fundamental principle.

16           "HIRANUMA: The candidate should be a mili-  
17 tary man. I also agree with Prince KONOYE in that  
18 the new premier should be one with no previous connec-  
19 tions. With the purport of winning the confidence of  
20 the people in mind, it is my wish to have Admiral  
21 SUZUKI accept the premiership. As in the past, shall  
22 we appoint him after consulting him? In the present  
23 situation, is this procedure proper or is it not?  
24 I think it is proper to have him appointed by submitting  
25 the Ministerial Scroll to His Majesty without

1 consulting him.

2 "'KONOYE: So do I.

3 "'WAKATSUKI: That will be perfect. Nothing  
4 could be better.

5 "'SUZUKI: As I have said to His Excellency  
6 OKADA, I believe that for soldiers to meddle in  
7 politics is to ruin the country. It is proved by  
8 the fall of Rome, the eclipse of the Kaiser, and also  
9 the fate of the Romanoffs. As a matter of my princi-  
10 ple I am prevented from entering into politics. More-  
11 over, my hearing is bad. I beg to decline.

12 "'HIRANUMA: I have heard from President  
13 HARA about it, too. But the circumstances of today  
14 do not permit us to indulge in such talks. A man  
15 without involvement is desirable. Admiral SUZUKI is  
16 a soldier, but he enjoys His Majesty's deepest trust  
17 as a civil official. And the nation believes that he  
18 has no involvements, and he is a man of loyalty with-  
19 out a peer.

20  
21 "'TOJO: The attitude of Admiral SUZUKI is  
22 truly fine. The developments of the war are beyond  
23 conjecture. The enemy is getting impatient. He will  
24 try a bold strategy. He is likely to attempt landing  
25 somewhere on Japan proper. Home defense then will  
become the vital point. The government and the command



1 must be fused into one. Here the army must be con-  
2 sidered as the principal body. In this sense, we  
3 must have a soldier on the active list. Historical  
4 instances have been cited, but Japan is different  
5 from the countries of Europe. In their case, the  
6 command got into the government. The character of  
7 our command is naturally different. From this stand-  
8 point I believe Marshal HATA is suitable.

9 "KIDO: What is the view of Mr. HIROTA?

10 "HIROTA: I think a central figure in the  
11 armed services should take the post. That has been  
12 my wish always. But I do not know the person. Any-  
13 one who can control both army and navy will be all  
14 right.

15 "KIDO: What is the view of Mr. OKADA?

16 "OKADA: I cannot state my view since I  
17 know nobody.

18 "HIROTA: At this time of a grave situation  
19 state ministers should be appointed by Imperial order.  
20 An Imperial command means designation by name. I  
21 doubt if it is a procedure suited to the consent as  
22 has been the practice hitherto. I believe it proper  
23 for His Majesty to make direct appointments according  
24 to the cabinet members' list, without any consultation  
25 having been carried on in advance with the persons

1 concerned.

2 "'WAKATSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?

3 "'HIROTA: That is, there is no need of having  
4 the consent of the person himself.

5 "'WAKATSUKI: Do you mean to say that we  
6 shouldn't accept their private consent?

7 "'HIROTA: I didn't mean that we must not  
8 accept.

9 "'KIDO: I shall also give my opinion. As  
10 I had said previously now that the Japanese soil is  
11 on the verge of becoming a battlefield, strengthening  
12 of the government has become all the more necessary,  
13 and therefore an imposing and sedate cabinet which  
14 has the confidence of the people must be established.  
15 From this point, I think the opinion of His Excellency  
16 TOJO is plausible, but, personally, I hope to have His  
17 Excellency SUZUKI rise to the occasion.  
18

19 "'TOJO: At the present when our land is about  
20 to become a battlefield we must take special care or  
21 else there is a fear that the army may take an aloof  
22 standing. If the army takes an aloof standing, the  
23 cabinet will collapse.

24 "'KIDO: At this time it will be most grave  
25 if the army takes an aloof standing. Is there any omen  
or premonition of it?



1           "'TOJO: Can't say there is none.

2           "'KIDO: As I have said a little while ago,  
3 the anti-militaristic sentiments are quite strong and  
4 there are possibilities of having the people take an  
5 aloof standing.

6           "'OKADA: At this occasion when we are con-  
7 fronted with a grave situation, a national crisis --  
8 what do you mean by "taking an aloof standing" to a  
9 person who received the Imperial Command? Whose re-  
10 sponsibility is the national defense? Are they not  
11 the army and navy?

12           "'TOJO: Because of that apprehension, I said  
13 to take care.

14           "'WAKATSUKI: If there is such apprehension  
15 now, it is a serious matter. I believe that in so far  
16 as the Japanese people are concerned, there isn't a  
17 bit of such a thing.

18           "'Meeting adjourned at 8:00 p. m.'

19           "286. The prosecution exhibit 1282 as corrected  
20 says: 'At the conclusion of the meeting, the senior  
21 statesmen were asked to affix their private seals.'  
22 This is not translated properly. The correct trans-  
23 lation is 'At the conclusion of the meeting the senior  
24 statesmen were given a dinner by the Emperor.' The  
25 Emperor did not attend. Because Baron SUZUKI had

1 stated that he would like to decline the offer as  
2 the next premier, after all the conferees took dinner,  
3 therefore, I invited him to the audience chamber where  
4 the conference of senior statesmen had taken place  
5 and entreated him to accept it without being trammelled  
6 by his past professions or protestations if he was  
7 commanded by the Emperor to form a succeeding cabinet.  
8 Before that I explained to him the development of the  
9 war situation up to the present. On that occasion, I  
10 dwelt on the gravity of the war situation and made an  
11 allusion to the necessity for a volte-face in policy.  
12 Baron SUZUKI said he fully understood me and told me  
13 that if he was commanded by the Emperor to form a  
14 succeeding cabinet, nothing else would be his mission.  
15 I felt greatly reassured. He accepted the Imperial  
16 Mandate at 10 p. m., after I had fully explained the  
17 meeting of the senior statesmen to His Majesty, and  
18 had recommended Baron SUZUKI as Premier.  
19

20 "287. Within a month of the formation of  
21 the SUZUKI Cabinet, Germany collapsed and surrendered  
22 unconditionally to the Allies. Up to Germany's sur-  
23 render, it was thought that it would be open to  
24 criticism from the viewpoint of international faith  
25 to make peace proposals on the part of the Emperor  
even if the time had virtually come for the purpose,



1 especially since Japan concluded a non-separate-  
2 peace treaty with Germany. Now that Germany was  
3 gone, I believed that it would be desirable for the  
4 Emperor to make up his mind at this juncture, as  
5 peace would be restored to the world according to  
6 Japan's attitude.

1           "288. That the war situation of the Okinawas  
2 was hopeless, that with the bombing attacks by B-29's  
3 being intensified, many middle and small towns were  
4 burnt and a large number of people were rendered home-  
5 less, that production of aircraft and other munitions  
6 recorded a sharp drop, that the home forces, who would  
7 engage the invading Americans in a decisive battle in  
8 the Japanese mainland were poorly equipped -- all this  
9 had gradually come to the knowledge of His Majesty,  
10 who was greatly concerned over the situation. His  
11 Majesty asked me if there was no way of retrieving the  
12 situation. I understood that His Majesty asked Prime  
13 Minister SUZUKI the same question. In this direction,  
14 however, the Cabinet took no special measure, and  
15 events took a course of their own. On April 21, 1945,  
16 when the new Foreign Minister TOGO called on me, I had  
17 the first of a number of talks with him on the question  
18 of peace negotiations. Since then, I had free and frank  
19 exchanges of views with him on measures for saving the  
20 situation from time to time. Many people, not in  
21 government circles, called on me to express their views,  
22 feeling deep concern over the situation. For instance,  
23 Professors MINAMIHARA and TAKAGI of the Imperial Uni-  
24 versity of Tokyo called on me several times and gave  
25 me very useful suggestions. I had heart-to-heart talks



1 with them. The various talks I had with the fore-  
2 going and others are mentioned in my diary for April,  
3 May, and June, 1945.

4 "289. The SUZUKI Cabinet decided to open  
5 the Diet early in June. In view of the fact that a  
6 strong war sentiment used to be the keynote of Diet  
7 speeches in the past, I did not think that a Diet held  
8 at this juncture would have desirable effects on the  
9 outside world as it would hamper peace moves. There-  
10 fore, I inwardly embraced misgivings about the develop-  
11 ments of the Diet situation. Prior to the openings of  
12 the Diet, however, the military petitioned the Emperor  
13 to hold an Imperial conference in the presence of His  
14 Majesty in connection with the future direction of war.  
15 The military did not mean to terminate hostilities,  
16 but instead wanted to continue warlike operations so  
17 as to make a bid for a decisive battle on the Japanese  
18 mainland, while admitting difficulty in the prosecution  
19 of war on the basis of Japan's resources. The Imperial  
20 conference was held in the presence of the Emperor on  
21 June 8, 1945. I was deeply moved by Imperial solici-  
22 tude, so that I was convinced that there was no time  
23 to be lost. On June 8, 1945, therefore, I made up my  
24 mind and drafted a tentative peace plan for saving the  
25 situation. It was my intention to effect a great

1 reorientation for terminating the war, by stressing  
2 to Prime Minister SUZUKI and the three Ministers of  
3 War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs my tentative peace  
4 plan. My plan appears in my diary for that day as  
5 follows:

6 "June 8, 1945.

7 "Drafted a tentative plan of counter-measures  
8 against this national crisis (soparate sheets).

9 "(1) It is apparent that the fighting at  
10 Okinawa will, contrary to our expectations, end most  
11 unhappily on our part. Moreover, it is almost sure  
12 that the end will come in the very near future.

13 "(2) The statistics for our national power,  
14 appended for reference on the bills for the council in  
15 the presence of the Emperor, reveal the fact that after  
16 the latter half of the year we shall practically com-  
17 pletely lose our power in every way for prosecuting war.

18 "(3) Needless to say, that layman as I am in  
19 this field, I am not in a position to judge correctly  
20 what strategy the enemy will take in the future. Judg-  
21 ing, however, by the formidable power displayed by the  
22 enemy air force's mass attacks with incendiary bombs,  
23 it would not be difficult, nor would it take much time,  
24 to make a holocaust of all towns and villages through-  
25 out this country. If the enemy resorts to tactics to



1 destroy dwelling houses, loss of spare clothes and  
2 food stocks will follow in its wake. Farm villages  
3 have not been accustomed to air raids. Therefore, if  
4 they are suddenly subjected to aerial attacks, they  
5 will lose their all, especially since it will be ex-  
6 tremely difficult for them to disperse their belongings  
7 and stocks in advance. There are but meager anti-air  
8 raid defences in small towns and villages. Therefore,  
9 in case they are subjected to aerial attacks, their  
10 losses will be all the greater.

11           "(4) If my above assumption is not grossly  
12 mistaken, a keen shortage of food and clothes will  
13 occur throughout the country in and after the latter  
14 half of this year. This, coupled with the advent of  
15 winter, will cause social unrest of alarming proportions.  
16 I fear that the situation may get out of control.

17           "(5) From the above angle, I think Japan is  
18 called upon to take a resolute move for restoring peace,  
19 by terminating hostilities. By what method and step  
20 shall this object be attained, then? This is the  
21 question which calls for the most cautious study.

22           "(6) It is almost certain in the light of  
23 various announcements, speeches and essays made public  
24 by the enemy by way of a peace offensive that it is the  
25 enemy's major object to overthrow the so-called gumbatsu

1 or militarists in this country.

2       "(7) I believe, therefore, that the ortho-  
3 dox way of opening peace negotiation will be to propose  
4 peace on the part of the fighting services and then  
5 decide on a peace plan and open peace negotiation on  
6 the part of the Government. But it will be almost  
7 impossible to do so at this juncture, judging by Japan's  
8 actual conditions. Further if we wait for the oppor-  
9 tunity to ripe for it, it may become possible too late  
10 and Japan may share Germany's fate, so that even  
11 security of the Imperial family and vindication of the  
12 national polity, Japan's minimum demands, may not be  
13 guaranteed.

14       "(8) In the light of precedents, it will be  
15 exceptional, and we shall be struck with awe and trepid-  
16 ation to do so, but I believe that there will be no  
17 other course left to us but to petition for Imperial  
18 intervention for the sake of the people and take  
19 peace moves by terminating hostilities in accordance  
20 with the following policy.  
21



1           "(9) Negotiation will be started with the  
2 intermediary power in pursuance of the Emperor's  
3 personal message. It may be a good idea to open  
4 peace negotiation direct with America and Britain, if  
5 possible, but it may be more advisable to ask the  
6 Soviet Union, which maintains neutrality with Japan,  
7 to mediate between Japan and the Allies with some  
8 latitude allowed to this country.

9           "(10) The keynote of the Emperor's personal  
10 message will follow that of the Imperial Rescript on  
11 the declaration of war, emphasizing His Majesty's  
12 constant concern for peace and his decision to conclude  
13 peace with general terms in view of war ravages and  
14 for the sake of world peace, by bearing the unbearable.  
15 The limit of peace terms:

16           "Honorable peace (it may be inevitable that  
17 this will be the minimum term). If guarantee is  
18 obtained that the Pacific be made true to its name,  
19 in view of the object of Japan's declaration of war,  
20 Japan will renounce her right of occupation and claim  
21 of leadership for those areas now under her occupation,  
22 if only the nations and peoples there attain their  
23 independence. The Japanese armed forces stationed in  
24 the areas under occupation will be withdrawn by Japan,  
25 at her own initiative. (In this case, some Japanese

1 forces may be compelled to abandon their arms on the  
2 spot, but it may be left to future negotiation.)

3       "(11) As for armament reduction, Japan  
4 must be prepared to make a pretty heavy reduction in  
5 armament, which she will be demanded to effect. There  
6 will be no alternative for Japan but to be content with  
7 a minimum armament required for her national defence.  
8 This is my personal opinion, which is candidly expressed.  
9 It contains only the essential points. It goes with-  
10 out saying that terms of negotiation and others will  
11 have to be adjusted by seeking the views of experts  
12 in various quarters.'

13       "290. With my tentative peace plan being  
14 decided as shown above, I showed it to Chief Secretary  
15 MATSUDAIRA the next day, that is, June 9, 1945 and had  
16 a full exchange of views with him on it. Prior to  
17 this, I had been secretly in touch with Mr. KASE of  
18 the Foreign Office and Colonel MATSUTANI of the War  
19 Ministry through Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA in con-  
20 nection with peace moves or measures for terminating  
21 the war. If my tentative peace plan was to be put  
22 into practice, therefore, it was necessary to seek  
23 their views. So I asked Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA  
24 to get in touch with them immediately. At 1:30 p.m.  
25 the same day, I had an audience with the Emperor when



1 I fully reported to His Majesty on my tentative peace  
2 plan and obtained Imperial sanction to consult the  
3 Prime Minister, and the three Ministers, War, Navy  
4 and Foreign Affairs there anent. His Majesty, who  
5 was as deeply concerned as anybody else over the adverse  
6 developments of the war situation was greatly satis-  
7 fied with my memorial, especially since His Majesty  
8 grieved that many medium and small open towns were  
9 reduced to ashes by bombing attacks one after another  
10 in quick succession, with a large number of innocent  
11 people being rendered homeless. His Majesty commanded  
12 me to set my hand to the tentative peace plan imme-  
13 diately. My diary for June 9, 1945 states:

14 "June 9, 1945. At 11 a.m., I had a full  
15 exchange of views with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA on  
16 the countermeasures against the pending national crisis.  
17 From 1:30 to 2 p.m., I had an audience with the Emperor  
18 at Gobunko, when I fully reported to the Throne on the  
19 measures for saving the national situation. His Majesty  
20 was pleased to tell me his intentions.'

21 "291. The Diet happened to be in session,  
22 so that Prime Minister SUZUKI and all other cabinet  
23 ministers were very busy. So I refrained from approach-  
24 ing them with the peace plan. It was on June 13, 1945,  
25 the day when the Diet was formally closed, that I had

1 talks with Prime Minister SUZUKI and Navy Minister  
2 YONAI about the peace plan. At 10 a.m., June 13,  
3 1945 Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the palace  
4 when I met and told him my idea roughly. I promised  
5 him to meet him again later. Then, Navy Minister  
6 YONAI proceeded to the palace when I met and told him  
7 my idea, stressing to him that a survey of the outlook  
8 on the war situation showed that there was no time to  
9 be lost. I was acquainted with Navy Minister YONAI's  
10 frame of mind through Mr. HIROSE, Hisatada so that I  
11 did not anticipate any opposition to my idea from the  
12 Navy Minister. When he heard my plan, Navy Minister  
13 YONAI entirely agreed with me. But he complained that  
14 the Prime Minister's real intentions were not yet  
15 fully known to him and, therefore, that he could not  
16 launch a movement for peace while he was a cabinet  
17 minister. Pointing out that I had an appointment with  
18 the Prime Minister to see him later, I assured Navy  
19 Minister YONAI that I would ascertain the Prime Minis-  
20 ter's real intentions and let him know. I pledged  
21 with Navy Minister YONAI to be in closer touch hence-  
22 forth and do our best together for attainment of the  
23 common object.  
24  
25



"292. At 3.30 p.m., Prime Minister

1 SUZUKI came to my room when I had a talk with him  
2 about the outlook on the war situation. I asked him  
3 how long he thought Japan's fighting power would last.  
4 The Prime Minister replied that August would witness  
5 a sharp drop in Japan's fighting potential. There-  
6 upon, I told him my idea. After telling him about  
7 the details of my report to the Throne on my tentative  
8 peace plan which was approved by His Majesty, I laid  
9 bare my heart to him and urged him to do his best  
10 for termination of the war for the sake of the  
11 Imperial family's security and safeguarding of the  
12 national polity. My appeal struck a sympathetic chord  
13 in the Prime Minister who emphatically pledged to do  
14 his bit. I felt greatly reassured. On that occasion,  
15 I told him about my interview with Navy Minister  
16 YONAI which had just preceded my meeting with the  
17 Prime Minister, and said that the Navy Minister was  
18 afraid that the Prime Minister might be pretty vigor-  
19 ous in his sentiment. The Prime Minister smiled and  
20 said: 'Is that so? On my part, I thought YONAI was  
21 pretty strong in his sentiment.' This episode brought  
22 to light that both the Prime Minister and the Navy  
23 Minister were likeminded. It was very lucky for the  
24 smooth progress of the task. My diary for June 13,  
25

1 1945 records:

2           "'June 13, 1945 \*\*\* My gracious! Had an  
3 interview with Navy Minister YONAI in His Majesty's  
4 library when I had talks with him about counter-  
5 measures to save the situation. At 3:30 p.m., Prime  
6 Minister SUZUKI came to my room to have talks with  
7 me about the same topic. I felt assured to learn that  
8 he was as anxious as I.'

9           "293. Navy Minister YONAI on June 15, 1945  
10 came to my room and told me about his interview with  
11 the Prime Minister. He said that he advised Prime  
12 Minister SUZUKI, who was scheduled to visit the Grand  
13 Shrines at Ise on June 16, to strengthen his determina-  
14 tion, by reporting it to the Sun Goddess. On my part,  
15 I told the Navy Minister about my own interview with  
16 the Prime Minister. I took occasion to express my  
17 hope that Navy Minister YONAI would not only fully  
18 cooperate with Prime Minister SUZUKI, but also to en-  
19 courage him. I also had an interview with Foreign  
20 Minister TOGO in my room at 10:00 a.m., June 15, 1945,  
21 when I asked him to formulate a definite peace plan,  
22 after telling him about my tentative peace plan, which  
23 was approved by the Emperor. I had had talks with  
24 Foreign Minister TOGO before about this question. In  
25 principle, he was not opposed to my tentative peace



1 plan, but pointing out the vigorous war decision just  
2 recently adopted at the Imperial conference in the  
3 presence of the Emperor, he wondered how to adjust  
4 the peace plan with it. He feared that from the view-  
5 point of conducting routine business, the Foreign  
6 Office would be in a very difficult position. I was  
7 not unaware of it. On the contrary, the very decision  
8 adopted by the Imperial conference, impelled me to  
9 make an extraordinary determination, as I was con-  
10 vinced that it would not serve any purpose. Assuring  
11 him that I would do my best so as to facilitate the  
12 Foreign Minister's work, I requested Mr. TOGO to formu-  
13 late a definite peace plan without delay. My diary  
14 for June 15, 1945 states:

15 "June 15, 1945. At 10:00 Foreign Minister  
16 TOGO called at my office to discuss measures for  
17 saving the situation. At 11:00 Navy Minister YONAI  
18 called and gave me detailed reports of his interview  
19 with the Prime Minister.'

20 "294. On the other hand, War Minister  
21 ANAMI happened to call on me on some other business  
22 on June 18, 1945. I took occasion to ask for his  
23 approval of my tentative peace plan, after telling  
24 him about the steps taken for terminating the war.  
25 The War Minister was generally of the same opinion as

1 I concerning the outcome of the Okinawa campaign and  
2 the outlook on the war situation, but argued that it  
3 would be better to take peace moves after dealing  
4 the enemy a telling blow in case he undertook land-  
5 ing operations on the Japanese mainland. In reply,  
6 I said:

7 "The enemy will not hurry to undertake  
8 landing operations on the Japanese mainland. It is  
9 almost certain that prior to undertaking landing  
10 operations, the enemy will make a holocaust of medium  
11 and small towns throughout the country to demoralize  
12 the Japanese people. The Americans are now taking  
13 great pains for deployment as preliminary to their  
14 landing operations on the Japanese mainland. When  
15 this deployment is completed, their terms will not  
16 be easy ones. If so, the Japanese will have no other  
17 course left to them but to fight to the bitter end.  
18 In such an eventuality, there will be little hope of  
19 safeguarding of the national polity. This is the point  
20 about which the Emperor is most solicitous.'

21 "295. It was with difficulty that I per-  
22 suaded War Minister ANAMI to approve my tentative  
23 peace plan. Although I tried to keep my efforts for  
24 peace as secret as possible, the Army suspected what I  
25 was doing and there was some talk they wanted to oust



1 me as Lord Keeper. War Minister ANAMI spoke to me  
2 about this. My diary for June 18, 1945 says:  
3

4 "June 18, 1945. At 11:00, War Minister  
5 ANAMI called and spoke the progress of the Diet  
6 session, his connection with Gokoku Doshi Kai  
7 Society, the rumor regarding the change of Lord  
8 Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Chinese policy, the  
9 Yen-an operations (for an armistice), etc. I then  
10 brought out the question of the measures to be taken  
11 in the present situation."

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-  
13 past one.

14 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
15 taken.)  
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## AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I shall  
continue reading KIDO's affidavit, page 268, paragraph  
296.

- - -

K O I C H I K I D O, an accused, resumed the stand  
and testified through Japanese interpreters as  
follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

MR. LOGAN (Continuing): "296. On his  
return from Ise where he visited the Grand Shrines,  
Prime Minister SUZUKI toward the evening of June 18,  
1945 called a meeting of the component members of the  
Supreme Council for Direction of War and had free and  
frank exchanges of views with them on the termination  
of the war. On June 20, 1945 Prime Minister SUZUKI  
told me about the said meeting. In short, the War  
Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy  
expected much of the imminent decisive battle on the  
mainland. They argued that it would be better to



1 start peace negotiation on top of the military  
2 achievements to be attained on that occasion. It  
3 was understood, however, that agreement of views was  
4 reached by all conferees that efforts be put forth to  
5 seize an opportunity for restoring peace. In conse-  
6 quence, I had an audience with the Emperor at 1:50 p.m.,  
7 when I reported to His Majesty on what the Prime  
8 Minister told me. Now that everything had gone on  
9 so smoothly, I suggested His Majesty to summon the  
10 component members of the Supreme Council for Direction  
11 of War and command them to terminate the war, especial-  
12 ly since Foreign Minister TOGO felt so apprehensive  
13 about the recent decision of the Imperial conference.  
14 My suggestion was approved by His Majesty. My diary  
15 reports:

16 "June 20, 1945. \*\*\* At 9:00 a.m. Mr. KIMURA,  
17 Masayoshi called and spoke on the conditions in  
18 Shikoku. At 11:30 Premier SUZUKI spoke to me about  
19 the meeting held on the 18th inst. From 1:50 to  
20 2:15, attended on the Emperor at Gobunko and reported  
21 on the latest state of progress in our "saving the  
22 situation" attempt.

23 "At 2:30 called on the Chief Aide-de-Camp  
24 at his office and talked with him on the same subject.  
25 At 3:30 Mr. IWANAMI, Director of the Bureau of the

1 Imperial Treasury, called. At 3:45 Foreign Minister  
2 Togo called and we had a close talk over our "saving  
3 the situation" measures.'

4 "297. On June 21, 1945 I had a talk with  
5 Prince KONOYE about the war and the necessity for  
6 strenuous efforts for an early peace. I also had an  
7 audience with His Majesty and upon being asked about  
8 the coming meeting of the Supreme Council for Direc-  
9 tion of War, I advised him that he should state that  
10 the previous decision of June 8, 1945 should not  
11 hamper peace efforts. I told the Chief Aide-de-Camp  
12 there was to be a meeting of the Supreme Council in  
13 the presence of the Emperor. My diary for that day  
14 says:

15 "'June 21, 1945. \*\*\* At 12:30 Prince  
16 KONOYE called and spoke on the transition of the war  
17 situation. From 2:15 to 2:50 attended on the Emperor  
18 and presented my advice regarding the remarks His  
19 Majesty should make at the coming meeting of the  
20 Supreme War Directing Council. At 3:00, called the  
21 Chief Aide-de-Camp at his office and communicated  
22 with him about His Majesty's summons for a meeting  
23 of the War Directing Council.'

24 "298. On June 22, 1945, I made an arrange-  
25 ment with the Chief Aide-de-Camp to call the Council.



1 They were summoned by the Emperor at 3:00 p.m., when  
2 Imperial wishes for the termination of the war were  
3 conveyed to them. My diary states:

4 "June 22, 1945. \*\*\* On duty at Gobunko from  
5 12:30 to 1:00. At 9:00 a.m. Mr. SATO, Misugu called.  
6 From 1:25 to 1:55 attended on the Emperor at Gobunko.  
7 Made arrangements for the meeting of the War Directing  
8 Council with the Chief Aide-de-Camp at 2:00 and with  
9 the Grand Chamberlain at 2:15. At 2:45, Premier  
10 SUZUKI called to get in touch with me about the same  
11 matter. At 3:00 His Majesty summoned the members of  
12 the Supreme War Directing Council and communicated to  
13 them his desire regarding the conclusion of the war.  
14 Attended on Emperor at Gobunko from 3:50 to 4:05 and  
15 obtained the reports of the meeting as shown in the  
16 annexed paper.

17  
18 "At 5:00 returned home. Mr. AIKAWA,  
19 Katsureku called.

20 "(Appended Note, dated June 22, 1945)

21 "At 3:50 p.m., attended on the Emperor at  
22 Gobunko in response to his call. His Majesty spoke  
23 on the meeting of the members of the Supreme War  
24 Directing Council which he had summoned at 3:00 p.m.  
25 His Majesty said to the effect: The basic policy for  
directing the war had been decided on at a previous

1 council in the presence of the Emperor. For the  
2 measures for bringing the war to a close, it is also  
3 desired that we should, without being hampered by  
4 traditional ideas, study concrete means and strive  
5 for their prompt realization. When the Emperor  
6 asked for the opinion of the Premier, the Premier  
7 replied that the measures should be taken as His  
8 Majesty desired. Then Navy Minister YONAI, prefacing  
9 that he was probably intruding on the competence of  
10 the Foreign Minister in making such remarks, said  
11 that he had this subject in his mind as the third  
12 item of the plan he had ready at the previous council  
13 in the presence of the Emperor, but that the time was  
14 now pressing for its quick realization. Foreign  
15 Minister TOGO endorsed and supplemented the Navy  
16 Minister's answer. Finally His Majesty asked the  
17 opinion of General UMEZU, Chief of the General Staff,  
18 who answered that though he had no objection to the  
19 plan, great caution must be used to carry it out.  
20 Thereupon, the Emperor, after submitting the neces-  
21 sity of caution, asked if, being too cautious, we  
22 might not miss the chance. The Staff Chief answered  
23 definitely that we needed promptness.'

24  
25 "299. Baron HIRANUMA, President of the Privy  
Council, called on me on June 25, 1945, when I



1 obtained his approval of my tentative peace plan,  
2 after telling him about the developments of the  
3 situation up to date. Prior to this, the Government  
4 at the instance of Foreign Minister TOGO had opened  
5 secret negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador in  
6 Tokyo through Mr. Koki HIROTA, but they made no pro-  
7 gress at all. On the other hand, the Supreme Council  
8 for Direction of War in pursuance of Imperial wishes  
9 had been studying peace terms and others, but no  
10 agreement of views was reached. It would appear that  
11 time was wasted all around. The Emperor was deeply  
12 concerned over the situation, so that His Majesty  
13 told me about it. On my part, when I met Prime  
14 Minister SUZUKI and Foreign Minister TOGO, I urged  
15 them to hurry up. I happened to be ill and was con-  
16 fined to my home for several days. On July 3, 1945,  
17 the Grand Chamberlain under Imperial command called  
18 on me to seek my views. In response, I asked the  
19 Grand Chamberlain to submit my views to His Majesty  
20 that it would be proper for His Majesty to urge the  
21 Prime Minister to hurry up. As result, the Emperor  
22 on July 7, 1945 summoned Prime Minister SUZUKI to the  
23 palace and commanded him to enter into peace negotia-  
24 tion immediately. My diary for July 7, 1945 says:

"July 7, 1945. At 2:00 p.m. Prime Minister

1 SUZUKI came to my room and told me as in the annexed  
2 paper:

3       "'(Annexed paper): I was just received in  
4 audience by the Emperor who summoned me to the  
5 palace. His Majesty asked me how the negotiation with  
6 the Soviet Union was since going on. His Majesty went  
7 on:

8       "'It will not do to miss the opportunity  
9 by sounding the Soviet Union's real intentions. How  
10 about frankly asking the Soviet Union now for her  
11 mediation? How about dispatching a special envoy  
12 there with my personal message?"

13       "'I was moved by His Majesty's wise  
14 decision.'

15       "300. It may be seen from the extracts  
16 from my diary that the Government was too much engrossed  
17 in sounding the Soviet Union's real intentions with  
18 the result that the peace negotiation, which was  
19 most important, made no progress at all. With the  
20 Imperial reminder to the Prime Minister, the peace  
21 negotiation apparently got under way. Foreign  
22 Minister TOGO on July 10, 1945, and Prime Minister  
23 SUZUKI on July 11, 1945, told me about the subsequent  
24 development of the situation, when I spoke with them  
25 on the peace plan. The Government referred the question



1 of dispatching a special envoy to the Soviet  
2 Union to the Supreme Council for Direction of War,  
3 which decided that Prince KONOYE be sent to the  
4 Soviet Union as special envoy. On the morning of  
5 July 12, 1945, Prime Minister SUZUKI told me to that  
6 effect when he expressed his desire that as the matter  
7 required urgency, His Majesty personally should  
8 command Prince KONOYE to accept the mission. I  
9 was happy to hear of his proposal. Prince KONOYE  
10 chanced to return to Tokyo from Karuizawa the same day  
11 and proceed to the palace, so that the Emperor on  
12 that occasion summoned the Prince and commanded him  
13 to accept the mission. Thereupon, the Government  
14 instructed Ambassador SATO in Moscow to make a  
15 demarche to the Soviet Government about the dispatch  
16 of Prince KONOYE. The negotiation with the Soviet  
17 Union appeared to hold out hope. My diary for  
18 July 12, 1945 records:  
19

20 "July 12, 1945. At 9:20 a.m., Prime  
21 Minister SUZUKI called and told me about the matter,  
22 mentioned in the annexed paper. From 10:10 to 10:50  
23 a.m. I had an audience with the Emperor in his library.  
24 From 10:55 to 11:50 a.m., I had another audience with  
25 the Emperor when I submitted my views to His Majesty  
on the question as to who should be present at the

audience to be granted to Prince KONOYE and obtained Imperial sanction.

"At 11:30 a.m. Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the palace. Before he was received in audience I had an interview with him in His Majesty's library. At 2:00 p.m. Prince KONOYE came to my room when I told him about developments of the situation. At 2:50 p.m., I had an audience with the Emperor. Then Prince KONOYE was received in audience. From 3:35 to 3:50 p.m. I had another audience with the Emperor, when His Majesty told me about his audience granted to Prince KONOYE. At 4:00 p.m. Navy Minister YONAI came to my room when I had a talk with him.

"(Annexed paper): At 9:20 a.m. Prime Minister SUZUKI called on me suddenly and told me to the following effect: "I had talks with the Foreign Minister about the special envoy to be dispatched to the Soviet Union, but I should like to enlist the services of Prince KONOYE at this juncture as special envoy to the Soviet Union. Originally, Prince KONOYE was to have come up to Tokyo yesterday, so I wanted to persuade him personally to accept the offer. But he changed his plan, and it is expected that he will come up to town this morning. As there is no time to be lost, it will be better for the Emperor to command



1 or ask Prince KONOYE directly to accept the special  
2 mission to the Soviet Union, which will be an honor  
3 to the Prince, than to waste time in persuading the  
4 Prince to accept the offer on my part. I should like  
5 to submit my views to the Emperor to that effect in-  
6 formally this morning."

7 "Thereupon, I told the Prime Minister that  
8 the Emperor was now so enthusiastic over the matter  
9 that His Majesty made up his mind to send his personal  
10 message. I approved his proposal, saying that it  
11 would be rather a good idea. At 10:10 a.m., I had  
12 an audience with the Emperor in his library when I  
13 reported to His Majesty on the matter in advance.  
14 His Majesty was graciously pleased to approve of it,  
15 and decided to summon Prince KONOYE this afternoon.  
16 At 10:35 a.m., I had another audience with the Emperor  
17 when I suggested His Majesty that Prince KONOYE be  
18 received in audience without anyone being present  
19 at it, as exception. Recalling the inception of the  
20 practice that those other than the Minister of State  
21 must be received in audience by the Emperor in the  
22 presence of somebody else, the Emperor said that  
23 when the salary cut question arose during the HAMA-  
24 GUCHI Cabinet, a certain TSUTSUMI, former classmate of  
25 Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI, who was then serving with

1 the Railway Ministry, was reported to have submitted  
2 his personal report to the Throne. It came in for a  
3 storm of criticisms. Hence, His Majesty remarked,  
4 it was formally established that audiences be granted  
5 to those other than the Ministers of State in the  
6 presence of somebody else. In the case of Prince  
7 KONOYE, therefore, His Majesty said that there would  
8 be no necessity for it, and took my suggestion.

9 "At 11:00 a.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI  
10 proceeded to the Palace. Before he was received in  
11 audience by the Emperor, I had an interview with him.  
12 On that occasion, the Prime Minister told me that as  
13 the result of, subsequent to, cable to Ambassador SATO  
14 in Moscow about the dispatch of a special envoy to  
15 the Soviet Union with regard to the termination of  
16 the war for communication to the Soviet Government  
17 as immediate steps. It was suggested (by Mr. SHIDE-  
18 HARA and other) to defer the communication of the name  
19 of the special envoy and the Imperial message to an-  
20 other occasion. The Prime Minister also expressed  
21 his desire that His Majesty seek Prince KONOYE's  
22 views on the termination of the war and ask the  
23 latter to accept the possible offer in the event of  
24 a special envoy being sent to the Soviet Union,  
25 thereby reserving some latitude for his choice.



1       "(Annexed paper): At 2:00 p.m. Prince  
2 KONOYE proceeded to the Palace and visited me at my  
3 office. I informed him of the progress of affairs  
4 since this morning. At 2:50, prior to the scheduled  
5 audience of Prince KONOYE with the Emperor, I pro-  
6 ceeded before the Throne, and by way of precaution,  
7 reported on the matter of which Premier SUZUKI had  
8 told me this morning. At 3:00 Prince KONOYE was  
9 received in audience by His Majesty and retired from  
10 the Imperial presence at 3:15. Then he came to my  
11 office and spoke with me to the following effect:

12       "'"At the audience, His Majesty asked my  
13 opinion on the question of putting an end to the war."  
14 To this I replied as follows:

15       "'"Recently, I have often heard explanations,  
16 from Army personnel, of the possibility of the execu-  
17 tion of the war. These explanations might not be  
18 wholly groundless, granted that the figures cited by  
19 the exponents be trustworthy. But, on the other hand,  
20 explanations on the part of the Navy suggest the un-  
21 trustworthiness of such figures. Meanwhile, the morale  
22 of the general public cannot be said to be high. The  
23 only remaining hope of the people is that the Emperor  
24 may do something for them in some way or other as a  
25 last resort. Moreover, there are signs, though as yet

1 sporadic, that show resentment in some circles  
2 towards His Majesty. In view of these tendencies, I  
3 believe it imperative to terminate the war as early  
4 as possible. Thereupon, His Majesty remarked that  
5 He has the intention eventually to send me to the  
6 Soviet Union as a special envoy, and asked me to be  
7 prepared for it. I accepted the order respectfully."

8 "'In response to an Imperial summons, I pro-  
9 ceeded before the Throne (in the Gabunko) at 3:35.  
10 At this audience, the Emperor told me follows:

11 ""I have roughly disclosed my opinion to  
12 KONOYE and asked his opinion on the future course  
13 of the war. He replied that it is necessary to end  
14 the war. Therefore, I asked him if he would comply  
15 with my desire to send him to the Soviet Union. There-  
16 upon, he replied that he is ready to sacrifice his  
17 life in order to comply with my will, making me recall  
18 how I had told him, at the time of the formation of  
19 the Second KONOYE Cabinet, to share both joy and  
20 grief with me. This time he seems to be firmly  
21 determined.""

22 On that morning I had an audience  
23 with the Emperor.  
24 "301. It transpired later that it was one  
25 day before the departure of Stalin and Molotov for  
the Potsdam conference that the Government's instruc-  
tion reached the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. No



1 definite reply was forthcoming from the Soviet  
2 Government which communicated to the Japanese  
3 Embassy that it would give its reply after the  
4 return of Stalin and Molotov from Potsdam. Thus,  
5 prior to the Soviet Union's reply to Japan's demarche,  
6 the Potsdam Declaration was issued by the Allies at  
7 Potsdam all of a sudden. Now that things came to  
8 such a pass, I could not but foresee that Japan's  
9 peace problem would be confronted with difficulty of  
10 no small proportions. On August 6, 1945, the Amer-  
11 icans dropped an atomic bomb at Hiroshima, nearly  
12 reducing the entire city to ashes at a stroke.  
13 Japan had been on tip-toe of expectation of a reply  
14 from the Soviet Union. It was anticipated that  
15 Stalin and Molotov would return to Moscow on August  
16 6 or 7 when they would reply to Japan's demarche, as  
17 promised. But Japan's expectation was nullified.  
18 Not only that, the Soviet Union declared war on  
19 Japan and a state of war began to exist between the  
20 two countries on August 9, 1945.

22 "302. On that morning I had an audience  
23 with the Emperor when I advised him that there was no  
24 alternative left to Japan at this juncture but to  
25 accept the Potsdam Declaration and terminate the war  
as already decided by His Majesty. The Emperor who

1 was like minded commanded me to have a full talk  
2 with the Prime Minister, as it might be necessary  
3 to study and decide a termination of the war  
4 without loss of time. The events of August 9,  
5 1945 are recorded in my diary for that day. The  
6 prosecution introduced only six lines of my diary  
7 for August 9, 1945 (exhibit 1283), the complete  
8 entry being as follows:  
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1           "August 9, 1945, at 9:00 A.M. Mr. Yutaka  
2 OSHIMA and Mr. Mitsugi SAITO called on me, when I  
3 listened to their views on the policy toward the  
4 Soviet Union. From 9:55 to 10:00 A.M. I had an  
5 audience with the Emperor in his library, when His  
6 Majesty commended me to have full talks with the  
7 Prime Minister about the peace plan or termination  
8 of the war, which it might be necessary to study and  
9 decide without loss of time, after pointing out that  
10 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and a state of  
11 war began to exist between the two countries today.  
12 Fortunately, as I had an appointment to meet the  
13 Prime Minister this morning, I replied to His Majesty  
14 that I would confer with the Prime Minister immediately.  
15  
16           "At 10:10 A.M. Prime Minister SUZUKI came to  
17 my room, when I conveyed Imperial wishes to him. I  
18 took occasion to stress the necessity for making peace,  
19 by taking advantage of the Potsdam Declaration. I also  
20 asked the Prime Minister to explain to the senior states-  
21 men the situation in advance, reminding him that the  
22 Emperor wanted to seek their view of the importance of  
23 the matter. The Prime Minister left me, saying that  
24 they would like to decide Japan's attitude, by holding  
25 the Supreme Council for Direction of War at 10:30 A.M.

1 I had another audience with the Emperor in his  
2 library from 10:55 to 11:45 A.M., when I reported  
3 my talks with the Prime Minister to His Majesty.

4 "At 1:00 P.M., Prince KONOYE came to my room,  
5 when I had a free and frank exchange of views with him  
6 on the situation. At 1:30 P.M. Prime Minister SUZUKI  
7 came to my room, when he told me that the Supreme  
8 Council for Direction of War decided to accept the  
9 Potsdam Declaration on the following four conditions:

10 (1) Preservation of the Imperial House.

11 (2) Withdrawal of the Japanese troops on  
12 Japan's own initiative.

13 (3) Those responsible for the war be dealt  
14 with by the Japanese Government.

15 (4) No guarantee occupation be carried out.'

16 "(The entry of 1:30 P.M. is contained in  
17 exhibit 1283.

18 "My statement is erroneous. I found out  
19 recently that the Supreme Council for Direction of War  
20 did not make the decision mentioned. They had it under  
21 discussion.)

22 "My diary continues:

23 "At 2:00 P.M. the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to  
24 my room, when I received information on the war situa-  
25 tion along the border between Manchoukuo and the Soviet



1 Union. At 2:45 P.M. His Highness Prince TAKAMATSU  
2 personally telephoned me, expressing his fear that a  
3 conditional acceptance might be regarded by the Allies  
4 as refusal, as well as his views on measures to save  
5 the situation. From 3:15 to 3:20 P.M. I had an audience  
6 with the Emperor in his library to report to His  
7 Majesty on the apprehension voiced by His Highness  
8 Prince TAKAMATSU.

9 "As Prince LINGIN was killed when Hiroshima  
10 was bombed, I visited his palace to express my condo-  
11 lences. At 4:00 P.M. SHIGEMITSU came to my room, when  
12 he urged me to act tactfully, contending that the peace  
13 negotiation was sure to break down in case Japan  
14 submitted the four conditions in accepting the Potsdam  
15 Declaration.

16 "From 4:35 to 5:10 P.M. I had another audience  
17 with the Emperor in his library. At 6:30 P.M. I returned  
18 home. At 8:00 P.M. I attended office again. From  
19 10:50 to 10:53 P.M. I had still another audience with  
20 the Emperor to report to His Majesty on a change in the  
21 Cabinet's countermeasures.'

22 "(It was at this time that the Cabinet, being  
23 unable to arrive at a decision to accept the Potsdam  
24 Declaration on the sole condition of preservation of  
25 the Imperial House, decided to submit it to the Emperor

1 for decision. As explained above, the Supreme Council  
2 had not made a decision at 1:30 P.M., so this was not  
3 a change of decision.) My diary continues:

4 "Prime Minister SUZUKI was received in audience,  
5 when he petitioned His Majesty to hold an Imperial  
6 conference and to permit Baron HIRANUMA, President  
7 of the Privy Council, to attend the said conference.  
8 From 11:25 to 11:37 P.M. I had another audience with  
9 the Emperor. The Imperial Conference was held in  
10 the presence of His Majesty in the room attached to  
11 his library from 11:50 P.M. August 9, to 2:20 A.M.  
12 August 10, when it was decided to accept the Potsdam  
13 Declaration on the sole condition of reaffirmation of  
14 the Emperor's sovereignty and the Imperial House, the  
15 draft plan prepared by the Foreign Minister, thanks to  
16 His Majesty's decision.'



1 "303. My diary for the next day, August 10, 1945,  
2 follows:

3 "August 10, 1945. Following the close of  
4 the Imperial Conference, I was summoned by the Emperor  
5 and had an audience with His Majesty from 2:32 to 2:38  
6 A.M., when His Majesty told me about the Imperial  
7 decision. I listened, filled with emotion and trepida-  
8 tion. The memorable Imperial decision is as follows  
9 in substance:

10 "The Army vigorously advocates the necessity  
11 of giving a decisive battle to the invading enemy on  
12 the homeland. But fortifications on Kujukuri-hama  
13 (beach) which are most important are not yet completed,  
14 nor is equipment of the division of the Army which will  
15 give the said decisive battle to the enemy complete.  
16 I understand the division's equipment will not be com-  
17 pleted before the middle of September. Nor is the  
18 increased production of aircraft going on smoothly.  
19 Planning is not followed by practice on all occasions.  
20 Such being the case, how can we win the war? Needless  
21 to say that I could not bear the sight of our loyal  
22 troops being disarmed, or those responsible for the  
23 war being punished, especially since they were unswerv-  
24 ing in their devotion and unalloyed in their loyalty  
25 to me. But I think that now is the time to bear the

1 unbearable. Recalling the Emperor MEIJI's feeling  
2 when he was confronted with the Triple Intervention,  
3 I repress my tears and approve the draft plan."

4 "At 3:00 A.M., returned home. Hardly I  
5 went to sleep when Tokyo was subjected to an air-raid.  
6 From 9:50 to 11:10 A.M., I had an audience with the  
7 Emperor in his library. At 12:30 P.M., Admiral  
8 HYAKUTAKE came to my room, when I had talks with him.

9 "At 1:00 P.M. Count MAKINO came to my room,  
10 when I explained to him the developments of the  
11 situation up to date. Then, Count MAKINO proceeded  
12 to His Majesty's library where he was received in  
13 audience to submit his views to His Majesty.

14 "The senior statesmen were summoned by the  
15 Emperor. The seven senior statesmen, Messrs. HIRANUMA,  
16 WAKATSUKI, OKADA, KONOYE, HIROTA, TOJO and KOISO, pro-  
17 ceeded to the palace. From 3:35 to 4:30 P.M. they were  
18 received in audience by the Emperor in the room attached  
19 to his library, when they separately submitted their  
20 views to His Majesty. I was also present at the audience,  
21 attending on His Majesty.

22 "From 4:35 to 4:45 P.M. I had another audience  
23 with the Emperor (in his library).

24 "I had visits from Admiral YAMAMOTO at 5:30  
25 P.M. and by Mr. Seikun MATSUI at 6:00 P.M. I had talks



1 with them. At 8:30 P.M. I was summoned by His Highness  
2 Prince MIKASA and proceeded to his palace, when I  
3 reported to His Highness on the developments of the  
4 situation up to date. Shortly after 9:00 P.M. Prince  
5 KONOYE called on me at my home, saying that he was  
6 disturbed by the proclamation of the War Minister  
7 issued to the whole Army. We had a confidential  
8 conversation on various important matters.'

9 "304. On August 10, 1945, atomic bombs were  
10 dropped at Nagasaki City causing a large number of  
11 victims. This gave a great shock to the nation,  
12 together with the Soviet Union's participation in the  
13 Pacific war on the Allied side, imparting a sudden and  
14 powerful stimulus to controversies as well as moves  
15 and countermoves between the peace and war parties in  
16 this country. Surveying the situation, I foresaw  
17 various difficulties ahead, to overcome which I thought  
18 that there would be no course left but to broadcast an  
19 Imperial Rescript to the nation on the part of the  
20 Emperor terminating the war. I called on Mr. ISHIWATA,  
21 Minister of the Imperial Household, in his room and  
22 consulted him about the matter. The Minister of the  
23 Imperial Household approved my proposal. Therefore,  
24 I had an audience with the Emperor at 3:55 P.M. and  
25 petitioned his Majesty to approve my proposal, after

1 fully explaining it to him. The Emperor was gracious  
2 enough to assure me that he would be ready to broadcast  
3 his message to the nation any time. Imperial approval  
4 promised a full materialization for my proposal, which  
5 was conceived by me as the last resort to pave the way  
6 for peace for Japan.

7 "305. At 5:00 P.M. I again called on the  
8 Minister of the Imperial Household and discussed  
9 preparations for the purpose, after conveying Imperial  
10 wishes to him. No reply was received from the Allies  
11 on August 11, 1945. I passed the day in fretful  
12 impatience. Meanwhile, Marquis Yoshichika TOKUGAWA  
13 sent a letter to me, emphasizing that the country could  
14 not be saved at this juncture except by a 'kinki  
15 kakumei' (revolution, carried out with the Imperial  
16 standard unfurled.) My diary for August 11, 1945 says:

17 "August 11, 1945. At 9:00 A.M., I attended  
18 office, after visiting my father's tomb in the Somei  
19 cemetery. From 9:55 to 10:10 A.M. I had an audience  
20 with the Emperor in his library. At 11:00 A.M. Foreign  
21 Minister TOGO proceeded to the palace, when I had an  
22 interview with him. At 11:45 A.M., Mr. Kenjo SAJI  
23 brought a letter from Marquis Yoshichika TOKUGAWA  
24 which stressed that Japan could not be saved at this  
25 juncture except by a "kinki kakumei" (revolution,



1 carried out with the Imperial standard unfurled). At  
2 noon, Prime Minister SUZUKI came to my room, when I had  
3 talks with him. He told me about the subsequent devel-  
4 opments of the situation. At 12:30 P.M., Mr. SHIMOMURA,  
5 Minister of State, came to my room, when I had talks  
6 with him.

7 "From 1:35 to 2:30 P.M. I had an audience  
8 with the Emperor in his library. At 2:30 P.M., Mr.  
9 ABE, Minister of Home Affairs, came to my room, when  
10 I had talks with him. At 3:30 P.M. I called on Mr.  
11 ISHIWATA, Minister of the Imperial Household, in his  
12 room, and suggested to him that the Emperor broadcast  
13 his Imperial Rescript to the nation, terminating the  
14 war. I had a free and frank exchange of views with him  
15 on this matter. From 3:55 to 4:50 P.M. I had another  
16 audience with the Emperor when I submitted my views to  
17 His Majesty on the Imperial Rescript to be broadcast,  
18 and other matters. At 5:00 P.M. I again called on  
19 the Minister of the Imperial Household and conveyed  
20 Imperial wishes about the proposed broadcast to him,  
21 that is, that His Majesty would be ready to broadcast  
22 his message to the nation at any time. The Emperor  
23 also asked me what should be done in view of the  
24 changed situation, though it was arranged that Her  
25 Majesty the Empress Dowager would visit Karuizawa.

1 I communicated the Imperial query to the Minister  
2 of the Imperial Household. At 5:30 P.M., Mr.  
3 MACHIMURA, Chief of the Metropolitan Police, came  
4 to my room, when I received information on the  
5 political and social situation. At 6:00 P.M. Prime  
6 Minister SUZUKI came to my room and had talks with me.  
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"306. On August 12, 1945 the reply from the Allies was received. At 11:00 a.m., Foreign Minister TOGO proceeded to the palace and submitted the Allied reply to the Throne. After withdrawing from the Imperial presence, the Foreign Minister anxiously told me that opposition to a reference in the Allied reply, paragraph 4, to the free will of the people might raise its head from among those Japanese who were anxious to guard the national polity jealously. Whereupon, I asked him what interpretation the Foreign Office put on the paragraph in question. He replied that the Foreign Office saw nothing objectionable in the paragraph in question. I thought that it would go nowhere to let our moves be swayed by the opinions of individuals at this juncture and therefore that we must abide by the interpretation of the responsible authorities and steadfastly proceed toward the goal. As feared by Foreign Minister TOGO, however, not only the paragraph in question became a serious issue with these Japanese who were jealous of safeguarding the national polity, but the military stiffened in attitude since the Allied reply was received. At 1:40 p.m., Baron HIRANUMA, President of the Privy Council, came to my room to express his opposition to the said paragraph from the viewpoint of one anxious to safeguard the

1 national polity. In reply, I told him that it would  
2 be better to trust the Foreign Office authorities for  
3 the above-mentioned reasons and proceed toward the goal,  
4 leaving things as they were.

5 "306. At 6:30 p.m., Foreign Minister TOGO  
6 again called on me when I was greatly surprised to  
7 learn from him that Prime Minister SUZUKI, too, appa-  
8 rently approved the opinion of Baron HIRANUMA, Presi-  
9 dent of the Privy Council, so that he felt very uneasy  
10 as to if the peace negotiation would be amicably con-  
11 cluded. Should the peace negotiation break down at  
12 this stage, I thought that Japan would have to face  
13 a situation far worse than that which would confront  
14 her if she had gone on fighting to the bitter end with-  
15 out interruption. I felt myself called upon to do  
16 everything in my power for the purpose of making the  
17 government proceed toward the peace goal, as origi-  
18 nally decided. I made my secretary telephone the Prime  
19 Minister to ask for an interview with him. It hap-  
20 pened that the Prime Minister himself wanted to see  
21 me. The Prime Minister promised to call on me later.  
22 So I decided to wait for him in my office. It was at  
23 9:30 p.m. that Prime Minister SUZUKI came to my room.  
24 He told me of various consultations he had today. He  
25 seemed very much annoyed by the argument of those



1 jealous of safeguarding the national polity. I said  
2 to him to the following effect:

3 "I have no intention to belittle the argu-  
4 ment of those who are anxious to guard the national  
5 polity jealously. But on the basis of his careful study,  
6 the Foreign Minister assures us that there is nothing  
7 objectionable in the paragraph in question. It would  
8 go nowhere, if our moves are allowed to be swayed by  
9 the opinions of individuals. Therefore, I think that  
10 there will be no alternative left to us but to trust  
11 the interpretation of the responsible authorities,  
12 that is, the Foreign Office. Should the Potsdam Decla-  
13 ration be refused at this stage and should the war be  
14 continued, Japan would have to sacrifice another millions  
15 of innocents, due to bombings and starvation. Even if  
16 a disturbance occurs at home through the acceptance of  
17 the Potsdam declaration we shall have only to throw  
18 away our lives. Without wavering or hesitation, let  
19 us carry out the policy to accept the Potsdam declara-  
20 tion."

21 "I felt greatly reassured to hear the Prime  
22 Minister say in reply emphatically, 'Let us do!' The  
23 High Command began to be stiffened in attitude about  
24 this time. Hence, difficulty was experienced in opening  
25 a meeting of the Supreme Council for Lirection of War.

This was another source of worry for me.

1           "307. The same afternoon the Emperor sum-  
2 moned the princes of the blood to the palace and ex-  
3 plained to them the object of his decision, just taken.  
4 His Majesty took occasion to ask them to unite solidly  
5 like one and assist him. In response, the princes of  
6 the blood stated that they would solidly unite like  
7 one to assist His Majesty. The gathering, which lasted  
8 from 3:00 to 5:20 p.m. seemed to have been marked with  
9 a very free and frank exchange of views. It was under-  
10 stood to have been a big success.

11           "308. Now that the situation reached such a  
12 stage as I might be summoned by the Emperor to the  
13 palace any time during the day or night time, I decided  
14 to pass the night in my office room without returning  
15 home, starting that night. Part of my diary of  
16 August 12, 1945 says:

17           "August 12, 1945. At 9:30 p.m., Prime Minis-  
18 ter SUZUKI came to my room and told me about various  
19 consultations he had today. I stressed him the neces-  
20 sity for courageously accepting the Potsdam Declaration,  
21 even if a disturbance should break out in the country  
22 as the result. I felt greatly reassured that he  
23 entirely agreed with me. I decided to pass the night  
24 too in my office room without returning home, starting  
25



tonight.'

1 "309. At 7:10 a.m., August 13, War Minister  
2 ANAMI unexpectedly called on me when he contended that  
3 the Allied reply, paragraph 4, could not be accepted  
4 as it was. Should Japan accept it, he argued, Japan  
5 would be ruined while safeguarding of the national  
6 polity would be eventually impossible. In reply, I  
7 said:  
8

9 "According to the interpretation of the  
10 Foreign Office authorities, there is nothing objection-  
11 able in the paragraph in question. As for the other  
12 parts of the Allied reply, we cannot but regard them  
13 as inevitable in view of the prevailing circumstances.  
14 Should Japan refuse to accept the Allied reply now,  
15 therefore, she would do so without any valid reason.  
16 In consequence, the Allies would find it impossible to  
17 understand why Japan changed her attitude. The result  
18 would be that the Emperor would come in for criticisms  
19 not only from the Allies, but also from the whole  
20 world for his folly or craziness. As I understand that  
21 His Majesty has taken his decision with profound  
22 thought, we must act in pursuance of the Imperial deci-  
23 sion. There is no course left to Japan now but to  
24 accept the Allied reply.'

25 "310. Our conversations were dropped without

1 reaching an agreement of views on our part. We were  
2 agreed on the necessity for safeguarding the national  
3 polity, but we had different views on the outlook on  
4 the situation as well as on the measure for safeguarding  
5 the national polity. A meeting of the Supreme Council  
6 for Direction of War was not held on August 13 in spite  
7 of Prime Minister SUZUKI's extraordinary efforts for  
8 the purpose. A precious day was wasted. The delay  
9 in Japan's acceptance stimulated the Allies who began  
10 to speculate that Japan might eventually refuse to accept  
11 the Allied reply.

12 "311. On the morning of August 14, 1945, I  
13 received information that enemy aircraft were dropping  
14 handbills throughout the country, containing the Allied  
15 reply to Japan. I immediately saw that a very serious  
16 situation was being caused. Put in another form, if  
17 the Japanese troops in their positions in various parts  
18 of the country saw those handbills, no wonder that  
19 **they** should feel highly indignant, leading to con-  
20 fusion. I feared that the situation might get out of  
21 control. Therefore, I immediately proceeded to His  
22 Majesty's library and petitioned His Majesty for an  
23 audience. At 8:30 a.m., I was received in audience  
24 by the Emperor when I submitted my views fully to  
25 His Majesty, urging him to command the government



1 without further loss of time to go through the forma-  
2 lities for terminating the war. I was filled with  
3 emotion and trepidation to find that the Emperor had  
4 the identical views as I, with a very firm determination.

5 "312. Prime Minister SUZUKI happened to pro-  
6 ceed to the palace, so I asked him what progress the  
7 government was making with the peace plan. The Prime  
8 Minister told me that the High Command did not approve  
9 of the convocation of the Supreme Council of Direction  
10 of War yet. The army contended that the Supreme Coun-  
11 cil for Direction of War be convoked after one o'clock  
12 in the afternoon, but the navy did not even manifest  
13 its attitude toward the question as to when the coun-  
14 cil be called, added the Prime Minister. Whereupon, I  
15 told him my views which I submitted to the Throne. I  
16 stressed to him that there would be no alternative  
17 left to him but to petition the Emperor not only to  
18 convoke a joint Imperial conference of the cabinet mi-  
19 nisters and the component members of the Supreme Coun-  
20 cil for Direction of War, but to command the termina-  
21 tion of the war and drafting of an Imperial Rescript,  
22 terminating the war. The Prime Minister approved of  
23 my proposals. Accordingly, I jointly petitioned the  
24 Emperor with Prime Minister SUZUKI at 8:40 a.m. for  
25 an audience. When we were received in audience, Prime

1 Minister SUZUKI reported to His Majesty on what hap-  
2 pened since the morning and petitioned him to convoke  
3 an Imperial conference with the above-mentioned object.  
4 As the result, His Majesty convoked a joint Imperial  
5 conference of the cabinet ministers and the component  
6 members of the Supreme Council for Direction of War  
7 for 10:30 a.m. As it was, however, the joint Imperial  
8 conference got under way in the presence of the Emperor  
9 in the room attached to His Majesty's library at about  
10 11:00 a.m. when it was finally decided to terminate the  
11 Pacific War. At noon immediately following the close  
12 of the joint Imperial conference I was summoned by the  
13 Emperor. When I proceeded to the Imperial presence,  
14 His Majesty personally told me about the proceedings  
15 of the conference with tears in his eyes. I could not  
16 raise my head.

17 "313. Following the joint Imperial conference,  
18 the government pushed preparations for terminating the  
19 war which was submitted by Prime Minister SUZUKI to  
20 the Emperor at 8:30 p.m. and obtained Imperial sanction.  
21 Then, preliminary to the projected broadcast of the  
22 Imperial Rescript, His Majesty personally had his mes-  
23 sage recorded in a phonograph disc in a room of the  
24 Imperial Household Department building.  
25

"314. The great policy of peace, by terminating



1 the war, was thus decided upon, but whether it would  
2 be carried out without any hitch was looked upon with  
3 much apprehension. And the attitude of the army  
4 throughout the country was the most important factor,  
5 so that I conferred with the Grand Chamberlain and the  
6 Chief Aide-de-Camp, as the result of which it was  
7 decided, in case of necessity, to petition the Emperor  
8 to issue a precept to the army and navy. I requested  
9 the Chief Aide-de-Camp to ascertain the attitude of  
10 the ministers of the fighting services toward this  
11 question. The reply from the Chief Aide-de-Camp was  
12 that the ministers of the fighting services did not see  
13 any necessity for such a step. My diary for August 14,  
14 1945 says:

15 "August 14, 1945. Enemy aircraft are dropping  
16 handbills, containing the Allied reply to Japan. If  
17 things go on as they are, the whole country will be  
18 plunged into confusion, I feared. I submitted my views  
19 to the Throne when I had an audience with the Emperor  
20 from 8:30 to 8:35 a.m. I was filled with emotion and  
21 trepidation to find His Majesty possessing a very firm  
22 determination. From 8:30 to 8:52 a.m., I had an audience  
23 with the Emperor together with Prime Minister SUZUKI.  
24 His Majesty called a joint Imperial conference of the  
25 cabinet ministers and the component members of the

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Supreme Council for Direction of War for 10:30 a.m.  
1 From 9:15 to 9:37 a.m., I had another audience with  
2 the Emperor. From 9:50 to 10:40, I met the Prime  
3 Minister and conferred with him about the Imperial  
4 Rescript, terminating the war. From 10:55 to 10:5 a.m.,  
5 I had still another audience with the Emperor. At  
6 11:00 a.m., I was received by His Highness, Prince  
7 MIKASA, in the resting room for the princes of the blood.  
8 At noon immediately following the close of the Imperial  
19 conference, I was summoned by the Emperor who told me  
10 about the proceedings of the Imperial conference with  
11 tears in his eyes, so that I could hardly raise my head.  
12 I met the Grand Chamberlain at 1:30 p.m. and the Chief  
13 Aide-de-Camp at 1:50 p.m. to confer with them about  
14 the precept to be personally issued by His Majesty to  
15 the army and navy. From 2:00 to 3:05 p.m., I had an  
16 audience with the Emperor again. At 3:20 p.m., His  
17 Highness Prince MIKASA came to my room when I had talks  
18 with His Highness about the peace plan or measures  
19 for saving the situation. At 3:40 p.m., I had another  
20 talk with the Chief Aide-de-Camp when he told me that  
21 he reached the conclusion that both the army and the  
22 navy saw no necessity for the issuance of an Imperial  
23 precept. At 3:50 p.m., I had talks with Mr. ISHINATA,  
24 Minister of the Imperial Household Department. At  
25

4:20 p.m., Mr. MACHIMURA, Chief of Metropolitan Police,  
1 came to my room when he told me about the actual si-  
2 tuation in Tokyo. I received visits from His Highness  
3 Prince TAKAMATSU at 5:00 p.m. and also from Prince  
4 KONOYE. At 5:30 p.m. Foreign Minister TOGO and Prime  
5 Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the palace and were received  
6 in audience. Following their withdrawal from the  
7 Imperial presence, I had talks with them. From 8:00  
8 to 8:15 p.m., I had a further audience with the Emperor.  
9 At 8:30 p.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI submitted a draft,  
10 Imperial Rescript, terminating the war, to the Emperor  
11 and obtained Imperial sanction.'

12 "315. Towards the evening of August 14, 1945,  
13 Prince KONOYE called on me when he asked me if it was  
14 safe, saying that he heard that the Imperial Guard  
15 Division was rebellious. As I had heard no such rumor,  
16 I replied to the Prince that true to its name, the  
17 Guard Division would never resort to rebellious action.  
18 At 8:30 p.m., when I met Prime Minister SUZUKI, I recalled  
19 the story and asked him about it, but he replied that  
20 he did not hear any such rumor, so it could not be true.  
21 I paid no serious attention to the story and went to bed.  
22 B-29's attacked various towns during the night of  
23 August 14, news in connection with which was broadcast  
24 by radio, and the loudspeaker in my office room was  
25



1 turned on as usual. Shortly after midnight, however,  
2 the loudspeaker stopped short. Instinctively I thought  
3 that it was funny. But I argued to myself that something  
4 might be wrong with the loudspeaker. And I was dozing.  
5 And when I awoke, I found that the rumor about the  
6 rebellion in the Guard Division was true. At 3:20 a.m.,  
7 Chamberlain TODA came to my room and told me that part  
8 of the Imperial Guard Division apparently started a  
9 rebellion and occupied and cut off the communication  
10 facilities of the Imperial Household Department. His  
11 Majesty's library was surrounded, so that he could not  
12 get in touch with it, added the Chamberlain. I sensed  
13 that it was a very serious situation. Immediately I  
14 got up and dressed. I took refuge first in the room  
15 for the court physician on night duty pursuant of the  
16 advice of all, but I returned to my room and destroyed  
17 all secret and important documents and threw them away  
18 into the lavatory. At about 4:20 a.m., I took refuge,  
19 this time in the underground vault room together with  
20 M. ISHIWATA, Minister of the Imperial Household and  
21 there secretly watched the development of the situation.

23 "316. As all the communication facilities  
24 were seized by the rebels, the Imperial Household Depart-  
25 ment was completely isolated from the outside world to  
my great worry. Later, however, it transpired that

1 the only one direct telephone circuit between the  
2 office of the Naval Aide-de-Camps to the Emperor and  
3 the Navy Office was left intact, so that through it,  
4 communication was maintained with the outside and various  
5 arrangements were made. As the result, General Seichi  
6 TANAKA, Commander of the Eastern Army, personally came  
7 to the Imperial Household Department to control the  
8 rebels. All the rebels returned to their barracks in  
9 obedience to his command, so that the situation was  
10 under control at about 8 a.m. About 8 a.m., Chamberlain  
11 MITSUI came and told me that it was settled. There-  
12 fore, I proceeded to His Majesty's library with the  
13 Minister of the Imperial Household and paid our  
14 respects to His Majesty. According to Mr. ANEMIYA,  
15 an official of the Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy  
16 Seal, who was on night duty, rebel officers and men  
17 searched my office room for me no less than half a  
18 dozen times soon after I took refuge in the underground  
19 vault room and badly intimidated him to force him to  
20 confess my whereabouts.

21 "317. The object of the rebel force of the  
22 Guard Division was, first and foremost, to seize the  
23 phonograph record containing the Emperor's Rescript  
24 on the termination of the war. We were able to escape  
25 safely. Fortunately, the phonograph record was also



1 safe, so that at noon for the first time in Japanese  
2 history broadcast of an Imperial Rescript to the people  
3 was made.

4 "318. At about 4:30, the same morning, seven  
5 or eight men who called themselves special service  
6 gendarmes raided my burnt home at Akasaka, armed with  
7 hand grenades, revolvers and Japanese swords and searched  
8 for me. They had a dispute with the policemen on guard,  
9 one of whom was injured by them. Prime Minister SUZUKI  
10 thought that he fulfilled his mission when the Imperial  
11 Rescript was issued, terminating the war, and the  
12 rescript itself was broadcast. Therefore, he tendered  
13 his resignation to the Throne. At 3:50 p.m., I was  
14 summoned by the Emperor who commanded me to select a  
15 succeeding Prime Minister. In reply, I stated that I  
16 would recommend a succeeding Prime Minister to the  
17 Throne after consulting Baron HIRANUMA, President of  
18 the Privy Council, this time without calling a con-  
19 ference of senior statesmen. I obtained Imperial  
20 sanction. At 4:30 p.m. I invited Baron HIRANUMA, Presi-  
21 dent of the Privy Council, to my room and had a free  
22 and frank exchange of views with him on the matter, as  
23 the result of which an agreement of views was reached  
24 between the President of the Privy Council and me that  
25 there would be no subject capable of tiding over the

1 critical situation, especially in view of the future  
2 attitude of the army and navy and, therefore, that  
3 His Highness Prince HIGASHIKUNI be petitioned to emerge  
4 as new Prime Minister with Prince KONOYE assisting him.  
5 A report was submitted to His Majesty to that effect  
6 and Imperial sanction was obtained. My diary for  
7 August 15, 1945 states:

8 "August 15, 1945. At 3:20 a.m., Chamberlain  
9 TODA came to my room and told me that part of the  
10 Imperial Guard Division apparently started a rebellion  
11 at about 1:30 a.m. and occupied and cut off the com-  
12 munication facilities of the Imperial Household Depart-  
13 ment. His Majesty's library was also surrounded, so  
14 that he could not get in touch with it, added the  
15 Chamberlain. It was a serious affair, so I got up at  
16 once. I took refuge first in the room for the court  
17 physician on night duty in pursuance of the advice of  
18 all, but I returned to my office room and destroyed  
19 all secret and important documents and threw them away  
20 into the lavatory. At about 4:20 a.m., I took refuge,  
21 this time, in the underground vault room together with  
22 Mr. ISHIWATA, Minister of the Imperial Household, and  
23 there secretly watched the development of the situation.  
24 About 8 a.m., Chamberlain MITSUI came and told me that  
25 it was settled. Therefore, I immediately proceeded to



1 His Majesty's library with the Minister of the Imperial  
2 Household and paid our respects to His Majesty.

3 "At 9:20 a.m., Home Minister ABE came to my  
4 room when I had talks with him. From 10:10 to 10:30  
5 a.m., I had an audience with the Emperor in his library.  
6 At 10:50 a.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the  
7 palace. I met him in His Majesty's library.

8 "At noon, His Majesty personally broadcast  
9 his rescript to the people. I was overwhelmed with  
10 emotion and tears. From 2:50 to 3:30 p.m., I had  
11 another audience with the Emperor in his library.

12 "Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the  
13 palace and tendered his resignation, together with  
14 those of his cabinet colleagues to the Throne. From  
15 3:35 to 3:40 p.m., I had still another audience with  
16 the Emperor. From 3:50 to 4:00 p.m., an audience with  
17 the Emperor again, being summoned by His Majesty, when  
18 I was commanded by His Majesty to select a succeeding  
19 Prime Minister. In reply, I stated that I would recom-  
20 mend a succeeding Prime Minister to the Throne this  
21 time after consulting Baron HIRANUMA, President of  
22 the Privy Council, instead of calling a conference of  
23 senior statesmen. I obtained Imperial sanction.  
24

1           " "At 4:30 p. m., I invited Baron HIRANUMA,  
2 President of the Privy Council, to my room and had a  
3 free and frank exchange of views with him on the  
4 matter. As the result of which an agreement of views  
5 was reached between the President of the Privy Coun-  
6 cil and me that His Highness Prince HIGASHIKUNI be  
7 petitioned to emerge as new Prime Minister and Prince  
8 KONOYE be asked to assist His Highness.

9           " "At 5 p. m., Their Highnesses Prince and  
10 Princess TAKAMATSU came to my room. From 6:35 to  
11 6:45 p. m., I had a further audience with the Emperor  
12 in his library when I reported to His Majesty on the  
13 result of my consultation with Baron HIRANUMA. It  
14 was approved by His Majesty.

15           " "At 10:30 p. m., Mr. MACHIMURA, Chief of  
16 the Metropolitan Police, came to my room when he  
17 expressed his desire that the new cabinet be formed  
18 without a moment's delay.

19           " "I changed my bedroom this morning. I under-  
20 stand that at 4:30 a. m., this morning, seven or eight  
21 men who called themselves special service gendarmes  
22 raided my burnt home at Akasaka and searched for me  
23 when a policeman was injured.  
24

25           "319. The same gang at about 3 a. m., the  
next morning, that is, August 16, 1945, again went to



1 the residence of Mr. WADA where I had been staying  
2 and asked for an interview with me. I understood  
3 that they returned without doing any mischief when  
4 they found that I was away. According to my niece,  
5 Miss TSURU, Masako, who received them, the gang con-  
6 sisted of six or seven men, one of whom carried some-  
7 thing like a dagger on a 'sambo' (ceremonial tray).  
8 Their plan seemed to advise me to commit 'harakiri'  
9 with the dagger and to kill me in case I rejected  
10 their advice. Those who raided my burnt home at  
11 Akasaka on August 15, 1945 and those who visited the  
12 residence of Mr. WADA on August 16, 1945, belonged to  
13 the same gang, who later committed suicide at the top  
14 of Atago Hill with hand grenades.

15 "320. At 10 a. m., August 16, 1945, His High-  
16 ness Prince HIGASHIKUNI was summoned by the Emperor  
17 to the palace when the prince was commanded by His  
18 Majesty to form a succeeding cabinet. At 10:30 a. m.  
19 Prince KONOYE came to my room. His Highness requested  
20 Prince KONOYE to join his cabinet and assist him.  
21 Prince KONOYE accepted the offer and became His  
22 Highness's advisor. My diary for August 16, 1945,  
23 says:  
24

25 "'August 16, 1945. At 8:30 a. m., I invited  
Mr. OKANE, Vice-Minister of the Imperial Household, to

1 my room and made an arrangement with him about room  
2 accommodation and other matters in connection with  
3 Prince HIGASHIKUNI's formation of new cabinet. At  
4 9:40 a. m., His Highness Prince HIGASHIKUNI pro-  
5 ceeded to the palace. His Highness had an audience  
6 with the Emperor from 10:00 to 10:05 a. m. in his  
7 library when he was commanded by His Majesty to form  
8 a new cabinet. At 10:30 a. m., Prince KONOYE came to  
9 my room. He was asked by His Highness Prince HIGA-  
10 SHIKUNI to join his cabinet and assist him. He ac-  
11 cepted the offer and became His Highness's advisor.  
12 After the major part of the cabinet formation was  
13 decided, part of the Akasaka detached palace (eastern  
14 wing) was placed by the Emperor at Prince HIGASHIKUNI's  
15 disposal for setting up his headquarters for the forma-  
16 tion of his cabinet.

17 "From 1:50 to 2:15 p. m., I had an audience  
18 with the Emperor. At 4 p. m., Baron WAKATSUKI came  
19 to my room when I had a talk with him. From 9:05 to  
20 9:35 p. m., I had another audience with the Emperor in  
21 his library when I reported to His Majesty on the  
22 progress of the formation of the new cabinet.

23 "I heard that at about 3 a. m. this morning  
24 six or seven men visited the residence of Mr. WADA.  
25 "What a disquieting world it is!"



1 "321. At 11 a. m., August 17, 1945, Prince  
2 HIGASHIKUNI proceeded to the palace. and submitted a  
3 list of his cabinet personnel to His Majesty, who  
4 approved it. That day the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet  
5 took the first step toward peace. The following  
6 appears in my diary for August 17, 1945.

7 "August 17, 1945. I went to my official  
8 residence to which TSURUKO and others had moved  
9 a few days ago. When I was taking a bath, I had a  
10 telephone message from the office informing me that  
11 about 200 soldiers came up to Tokyo from MITO and  
12 the situation was alarming and asking me to come back  
13 to the office at once. At 4: p. m., I returned to  
14 the office. At 4:30 p. m., Foreign Minister TOGO  
15 came to my room when I had talks with him. At 5 p. m.  
16 Mr. OYA, Chief of the Police Department, came to my  
17 room when I had talks with him.'

18 "322. Thus, the war was brought to a  
19 termination together with my fight against the mili-  
20 tarists. It is unprecedented in world history that  
21 a power, engaged in a conflict of the Pacific War's  
22 scale and proportions made an unconditional surrender  
23 without remarkable confusion ensuing in its wake. I  
24 cannot help thinking that it was entirely due to  
25 Imperial virtues. To be frank, when the adverse

turn of the war situation became gradually known to the people, opinion gained strength among the intellectual classes that those close to the Throne be strengthened or the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal be strengthened. Some took the trouble to call and urge upon me its necessity. I fully understood that feeling deep concern as they did they desired that the Emperor be advised so as to act wisely and tactfully. No less fully aware was I of its necessity. But none the less I did not follow their advice. For it was my firm belief that in case Japan was overtaken by the worst eventuality, she would not be saved except by Imperial intervention. To facilitate Imperial intervention, I was convinced that it would rather defeat the purpose, if senior statesmen were assigned close to the Throne. Because Imperial intervention, carried out at a last stage, would be misunderstood as machinations of those close to the Throne. Should things come to such a pass, the Emperor would take all his trouble for nothing, while there would be every probability of an internal strife being let loose. Therefore, I did not reveal my real intentions to anybody except two or three very close to me. I consistently kept my silence. This accounts for various criticisms, heaped



1 upon myself. But all my trouble must be regarded as  
2 amply rewarded as there ensued no remarkable confusion  
3 following the termination of the war. On the contrary,  
4 the Emperor's virtues and influence were fully mani-  
5 fested. All this was indeed providential.

6 "323. In dealing with the delicate and  
7 difficult situation, which I was called upon by my  
8 official duty to handle, I was able to do my bit for  
9 humanity as well as for Japan. It is my inward satis-  
10 faction that I was instrumental in saving another  
11 twenty millions of my innocent compatriots from war  
12 ravages and also in sparing the Americans tens of thou-  
13 sands of casualties, which would have been caused, had  
14 Japan gone on fighting to the bitter end, which  
15 fanatically advocated the necessity of engaging the  
16 invading Americans in a decisive battle on the Japanese  
17 mainland.

18 "324. In conclusion I wish to state that I  
19 have tried to answer all the evidence presented which  
20 involved me without any intentional avoidance. If  
21 I have failed to mention any such evidence, it is  
22 an oversight. Furthermore, with respect to all the  
23 acts of aggression alleged in the Indictment and the  
24 various conspiracies, I was never at any meeting where  
25 war plans were formulated. At no time did I ever

1 approve or acquiesce by any act of mine in any such  
2 events. I made no speeches in favor of militarism and  
3 signed no laws approving or acquiescing in any aggres-  
4 sion. I was not a supporter of any preparations for  
5 war and was not a member of any organization in favor  
6 of it. I had nothing to do with treatment of prisoners  
7 of war or civilian prisoners. At no time did I ever  
8 participate in or create any political organization,  
9 police organization or military organization which had  
10 for their purposes the alleged crimes charged in the  
11 Indictment. I had absolutely no connection with the  
12 Kempeitai. At no time did I ever vote for initiating  
13 any war nor did I vote for the continuance of any war.  
14 I had absolutely no participation in any premeditated  
15 plan for aggressive war either in general or in detail.  
16 At no time did I take part in promoting any radio,  
17 movie, press or propaganda for the purposes of war.  
18 I never fostered or encouraged military training in  
19 the schools. I had absolutely nothing to do with  
20 construction of armaments for war purposes. I never  
21 advised a single person nor did I act as the agent of  
22 any individual to accomplish the initiation, commence-  
23 ment or waging of warfare. The advice which I gave  
24 to various people, as shown heretofore, had as its  
25 primary object the discouragement of war efforts and



1 the solution of problems by peaceful methods. At  
2 no time did I ever have any conversation with any  
3 of the other accused or any one else involving the  
4 planning, scheming, and conspiring as alleged in  
5 the Indictment. With regard to this alleged con-  
6 spiracy, I met the accused KIMURA, MUTO, DOHIHARA,  
7 HASHIMOTO, OSHIMA and OKA for the first time in  
8 Sugamo Prison. I met the other accused as follows  
9 to the best of my recollection: HOSHINO in 1941  
10 and SHIMADA in October 1941, after he became Navy  
11 Minister; MINAMI in 1939; TOJO, ARAKI, HATA, ITAGAKI,  
12 MATSUI, SATO and UMEZU in 1938; HIROTA and TOGO in  
13 1936; HIRANUMA in 1934; KOISO and SHIGEMITSU in 1932;  
14 SHIRATORI and SUZUKI in 1931 and KAYA in 1925.

15 "325. In short, my assumption of office as  
16 Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
17 in 1930 coincided with the start of a period of up-  
18 heaval of unprecedented magnitude in this country.  
19 This period of upheaval was featured by an extra-  
20 ordinary phenomenon of an advance made by army men  
21 on the political field. It was punctuated by about  
22 a dozen bloody incidents. Having believed as I did  
23 that it would lead Japan to a catastrophic end, I  
24 exerted myself to reroute politics into normal  
25 channels. During this period of upheaval, I served

1 close to the Throne as a court official -- first as  
2 Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
3 and then as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal with the  
4 exception of less than two years during which I  
5 served as Minister of State. My official duty had  
6 nothing to do with politics, but on the contrary  
7 strictly cautioned me against meddling with politics.  
8 I was not, therefore, in a position to give free  
9 and clearcut expression to my idea, but I did my best  
10 to be true to my idea within limits of my official  
11 duty. My idea was outlined in my advice, offered to  
12 Count MAKINO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,  
13 immediately after the outbreak of the May 15th Inci-  
14 dent, that is, on May 16, 1932. I have since been  
15 consistent in that idea for the past fifteen years.  
16 I think that from what has been stated above at  
17 length, you have fully understood my movements. Es-  
18 pecially, I risked my life during the February 26th  
19 Incident of 1936, before, during and after the resig-  
20 nation of the Third KONOYE Cabinet in 1941 and during  
21 the termination of the war in 1945.

22 "326. The China Affair broke out when I  
23 was President of the Bureau of Peerage in the Imperial  
24 Household Department. I knew nothing about the  
25 circumstances which had led up to the opening of



1       hostilities between Japan and China. Four months  
2       after the outbreak of hostilities, Prime Minister  
3       KONOYE desired me to join his cabinet. I accepted  
4       his offer at his request that I would work hard to  
5       terminate the China Affair as soon as possible. I  
6       worked hard for an early settlement of the China  
7       Affair, but the war situation went on expanding far  
8       more than generally anticipated, so that it became  
9       impossible to have any clear outlook on the future.  
10      The force of circumstances was gathering momentum on  
11      top of all this, threatening to compel Japan to plunge  
12      into a Pacific war. I could not bring myself to sup-  
13      port the new war under any circumstances. I was op-  
14      posed to the Pacific war from beginning to end. I  
15      never supported it in any positive way. I endeavored  
16      hard to seize every opportunity to avert it, as already  
17      mentioned. But alas! the American reply of November  
18      26 made me helpless, depriving me of all possible  
19      means to save the situation at the eleventh hour. The  
20      subsequent events took its implacable course with the  
21      really regrettable result that the war dogs were un-  
22      leashed. When hostilities opened I gave harried  
23      thought to the question as to what I should do. I  
24      decided there was only one course for me. I would  
25      render my best services to the Emperor and work for

1 peace. In taking a long-range view of Japan's  
2 future, I decided to try to save the country from  
3 impending misfortune by putting forth every ounce  
4 of energy to assist the Emperor, however difficult  
5 and trying the task might be. It is to be profoundly  
6 regretted that the developments of the war situation  
7 falsified all anticipations, indeed so much so that  
8 Japan had to surrender unconditionally. It is my  
9 sole consolation, however, that at the close of the  
10 war I was able to give full play to my bold activity  
11 under the august virtues of the Emperor, thereby  
12 succeeding in preventing the Japanese mainland from  
13 becoming a battleground and saving the lives of  
14 hundreds of thousands of people."

15 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
16 minutes.

17 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
18 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings  
19 were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

4 MR. LOGAN: I wish to ask Mr. KIDO one question.

5 DIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

7 Q Mr. KIDO, in your diary entry of March 9, 1932,  
8 Recitation of the October Incident, you mentioned three  
9 persons; HASHIMOTO, SATO and CHO. Is that SATO the  
10 accused SATO?

11 A No, that is not so.

12 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I understand  
13 there is to be further direct examination of Mr. KIDO  
14 by 7 counsel of the various accused and cross-examination  
15 by 3 others.

16 You may examine.

17 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel.

19 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, sometime past the  
20 Court made an order for the appearance before this  
21 Tribunal of some witnesses who were then in Soviet Russia.  
22 Five of them arrived in Tokyo, having travelled many  
23 hundreds of miles, and the sixth one is now at Vladivos-  
24 tok, expected as soon as his illness permits him to  
25 travel that distance. MURAKAMI, MATSUURO, TAKEBE,

1 Chernopyatko and Batarshin are present in Tokyo now,  
2 subject to the order of this Court to appear for  
3 cross-examination. The prosecution respectfully ask  
4 that they be brought into court with the slightest  
5 delay, because of the practical difficulties of keeping  
6 witnesses here in this jurisdiction, residing else-  
7 where, and ask the consent of the Court.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I suppose it is desirable  
9 to conclude the cross-examination, if any, of this  
10 witness, Mr. Chief of Counsel.

11 MR. KEENAN: That might be rather extensive  
12 in time, Mr. President. These witnesses, I take it,  
13 will have to come in sometime during the presentation  
14 of the individual defenses and the counsel wishing to  
15 cross-examine, of course, would have no right to inter-  
16 view them before so cross-examining.

17 THE PRESIDENT: I would propose that they be  
18 taken at the conclusion of this cross-examination of  
19 KIDO. You say it is going to take some time?

20 MR. KEENAN: Yes, Mr. President.

21 THE PRESIDENT: But it will commence almost  
22 immediately, won't it?

23 MR. KEENAN: Of course, we --

24 THE PRESIDENT: One of my colleagues agrees  
25 with me that we should await the conclusion of KIDO's



1 evidence.

2 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, we won't press  
3 the point any further. We are, of course, glad to  
4 comply with any wish of the Court. We wanted to inform  
5 the Court that they were here and it is a matter of  
6 difficulty to keep them here for any prolonged period  
7 of time.

8 But while on this subject, Mr. President, I  
9 have been informed by my Russian colleagues that the  
10 other witnesses that have been sought -- I do not have  
11 their names before me at this time -- will not be able  
12 to be presented to this Court because they are being  
13 held in Russia for purposes of security, and if their  
14 testimony is desired it will have to be taken by  
15 interrogatories.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

17 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, Mr. Blakeney  
18 who is handling this matter is not in the building,  
19 so that we have not been able to get in touch with him  
20 during the recess. We have not at any time known what  
21 witnesses were to be brought. It has been difficult  
22 in our position to prepare cross-examination and I do  
23 not know just what preparations Mr. Blakeney has made.

24 THE PRESIDENT: But you know what your cross-  
25 examination is going to be, otherwise you wouldn't have

1 asked that they be called for that.

2 MR. FURNESS: As for the other witnesses that  
3 are not being brought here, we do want to call attention  
4 to the fact that over 120 days, I think, have passed  
5 since the Court issued its order that they be brought  
6 here for cross-examination. I recollect the Court  
7 also included in its order that if they were not  
8 brought here, their testimony would not be considered.  
9 That was fully argued and I call attention to it,  
10 because of the prosecutor's remarks that any further  
11 testimony from these witnesses should be taken by  
12 interrogatories. We therefore do not wish this order  
13 to be changed, but instead to be affirmed.

14 THE PRESIDENT: The cross-examination of the  
15 witnesses now in Tokyo will be taken immediately after  
16 the conclusion of the evidence of the accused KIDO.  
17 As to the other witnesses who are being detained in  
18 the Soviet Union, the Court will consider the matter.

19 MR. FURNESS: I assume that if the Court is  
20 considering changing its order, it will hear arguments  
21 from the defense with regard to it.

22 THE PRESIDENT: The Court has not taken the  
23 matter into consideration. We are surprised at the  
24 announcement. I am going to consult my colleagues  
25 as to the steps we should take in the matter. If my



KIDO

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1 colleagues desire to say now that the Court's order  
2 must be enforced, I shall announce it.

1 MR. FURNESS: I now, if the Court please,  
2 conduct the direct examination of the witness in  
3 behalf of the defendant SHIGEMITSU.

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

5 BY MR. FURNESS:

6 Q Marquis KIDO, on page 120 to 180 of the  
7 English text of your affidavit, paragraphs 186 and  
8 216, you testify regarding the planned Prince KONOYE  
9 conference with President Roosevelt during the  
10 summer and fall of 1941. Do you know that it was  
11 proposed that a member of the Foreign Office of  
12 ambassadorial rank accompany Prince KONOYE on this  
13 mission?  
14

15 A I do.

16 Q Do you know what ambassador it was proposed  
17 to accompany him?

18 Q At that time, KONOYE told me that probably  
19 SHIGEMITSU would accompany him.

20 Q On page 148 of the English text of your  
21 affidavit, paragraph 195, you testify that your diary  
22 entry on September 25, 1941, indicates that Mr.  
23 SHIGEMITSU talked to you about the progress of negoti-  
24 ations in Washington. Do you remember what he said on  
25 this occasion, with particular reference to the general  
situation in Europe and America?



1           A    At the time, SHIGEMITSU had just returned --  
2           only a short time had elapsed since SHIGEMITSU had  
3           returned from his post as Ambassador in London.  
4           SHIGEMITSU told me of Britain's and America's firm  
5           decision -- firm determination, and earnestly pleaded  
6           that Japan should settle outstanding problems with  
7           America and that Japanese-American diplomatic re-  
8           lations should be adjusted.

9           Q    Now, on page 195 and 196 of the English  
10          text of your affidavit, paragraph 231, you testify  
11          that Premier TOJO told you of the decision of the  
12          Imperial Conference of November 5 and that it had been  
13          decided to make a final effort to settle the negoti-  
14          ations by dispatching Mr. KURUZU to America. Do you  
15          know whether the dispatch of a career diplomat of ambas-  
16          sadorial rank had been proposed prior to General  
17          TOJO's becoming Premier, during the time that Ad-  
18          miral TOYODA was Foreign Minister?

19          A    Yes, I do.

20          Q    Do you know who it was proposed to send?

21          A    I recall that Admiral TOYODA told me once  
22          that he had decided -- desired to send SHIGEMITSU to  
23          America.

24          Q    Now, Marquis KIDO --

25          MR. FURNESS: I ask that the witness be shown

1 his diary of 1941, specifically the entry of 23 July  
2 1941.

3 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
4 to the witness.)

5 A I have seen it.

6 Q Will you read the third and **fourth** sentences  
7 of that entry?

8 A Yes, I have read it.

9 Q Does it say, "Ambassador SHIGEMITSU made a  
10 report in the presence of the Emperor, and I was  
11 present. I was deeply impressed by the high spirit  
12 of Prime Minister Churchill"?

13 A Yes.

14 Q Do you remember what Mr. SHIGEMITSU said to  
15 the Emperor on the occasion of this audience?

16 A I have forgotten the smaller details, but  
17 this occasion was the time when Ambassador SHIGEMITSU,  
18 having just returned to Japan from England, was making  
19 his report to the Emperor. On that occasion SHIGEMITSU  
20 said that, although England was then in a difficult  
21 situation owing to her defeat at Dunkirk, Prime Mini-  
22 ster Churchill, with undying faith in final victory,  
23 was leading the British people on, and that the spirit  
24 of the British people was truly remarkable in their  
25 determination to win. Ambassador SHIGEMITSU on that



1 occasion told us a kind of anecdote to illustrate his  
2 point. It was around the time when France was about  
3 to capitulate, Churchill went to France and conducted  
4 talks with the French leaders, but finally France  
5 capitulated. Ambassador SHIGEMITSU met Prime Minister  
6 Churchill immediately after the latter's return to  
7 England. On that occasion, Churchill told him that  
8 since the Royal Navy had pledged their honor to  
9 defend the homeland, Churchill had conviction in that  
10 determination and was also determined to defend  
11 Britain to the last. I was very much impressed at  
12 this strong determination shown by Churchill, and the  
13 notation made in my diary mainly concerned this event.

14 Q Do you remember whether he said anything re-  
15 garding the spirit of the British people after the  
16 bombing of London and so forth?

17 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel.

18 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, the prosecution  
19 objects to this as being improper examination, outside  
20 the scope of the issues of this case.

21 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, it will  
22 lead up to the next questions which I shall ask with  
23 regard to the advice he gave as to entering the war.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is very difficult  
25 to see the relevance of these expressions of admiration

1 for the opponents. They are very pleasing to my ears,  
2 I can assure you, but whether they are relevant or  
3 material is the question.  
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1 MR. FURNESS: They are relevant in this sense:  
2 that they were not opponents then and he didn't want  
3 them to be.

4 THE PRESIDENT: I don't think any of us want  
5 to hear these eulogies from this witness, at least a  
6 majority do not. Wouldn't it be relevant, though, to  
7 get from him the advice given?

8 MR. FURNESS: I intend to come to that.

9 Q Do you remember whether Mr. SHIGEMITSU said  
10 anything to the Emperor regarding the likelihood  
11 of Great Britain being defeated or winning in the end?

12 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, the prosecution  
13 object to this on the ground that it is immaterial,  
14 because it is our theory that if these accused are  
15 guilty of conspiring to wage aggressive war, it doesn't  
16 make any difference whether they were choosing enemies  
17 that were difficult to defeat or easy to defeat. The  
18 crime exists in either event.

19 THE PRESIDENT: This does appear to be too re-  
20 mote, Major Furness. Advice would be relevant and  
21 material if you are leading up to that.

22 MR. FURNESS: That argument by the prosecutor,  
23 I submit, your Honor, assumes that they are guilty. He  
24 says if they are guilty then it makes no difference. I  
25 am trying to prove they are not.

1 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is upheld.

2 Q That, if anything, did Mr. SHIGEMITSU say to  
3 the Emperor regarding the advisability of Japan enter-  
4 ing the war?

5 A You mean on the occasion of his making this  
6 report?

7 Q Yes, I do.

8 A On that occasion he did not refer immediately--  
9 directly to the war -- to the question of the war.

10 Q Now, Marquis KIDO, on pages 208-9-10 of the  
11 English text of your affidavit you testified that in  
12 February, 1942, even after the series of victories by  
13 Japanese arms at the beginning of the war you expressed  
14 an opinion regarding the fighting will of your opponents  
15 and said that despite these victories efforts should  
16 be made to make peace as soon as possible. Did you  
17 base these expressions on any information you received  
18 from the defendant SHIGEMITSU, and if so, what informa-  
19 tion?  
20

21 MR. KEENAN: If the Court please, the prosecu-  
22 tion object to the practice in conducting direct ex-  
23 amination, of the examiner summarizing the testimony of  
24 several pages of the witness's affidavit. With 297  
25 pages to work upon, Mr. President, it could entail a  
very long examination. We ask that it be confined to



1 asking direct questions of this witness.

2 THE PRESIDENT: If a summary is necessary to  
3 put an intelligent question or an intelligible one,  
4 we must permit it, but we hope. Major Furness, that  
5 you will endeavor to shorten your questions as much  
6 as you can.

7 MR. FURNESS: I am doing so, sir, and I shall  
8 continue to make every effort to do so.

9 A One of the bases for my reaching this opinion  
10 was that after Ambassador SHIGEMITSU --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: On hearing  
12 Ambassador SHIGEMITSU report to the Emperor, I was re-  
13 minded once again of the tenacious character of the  
14 British people and of the strong determination of  
15 Churchill, who was their leader. I also became aware  
16 of America's fighting will, and in view of our national  
17 strength I felt that we should try to make peace as  
18 quickly as possible.

19 Correction: I also became aware that America's  
20 fighting will was very strong.

21 Q On page 222 of the English text of your affi-  
22 davit -- page 262 -- you testified that in January Mr.  
23 SHIGEMITSU expressed the opinion that substantially  
24 unconditional surrender would be unavoidable. Did he  
25 continue to express that opinion until the end of the

1 war.

2 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, the prosecution  
3 objects to this question and this line of questions,  
4 and is willing to stipulate with all the accused that  
5 we agree that the British are tenacious, and that may  
6 be a matter of record. It makes no difference whether  
7 unconditional surrender was necessary or not; it hasn't  
8 anything to do with the crimes with which these accused  
9 are charged.

10 THE PRESIDENT: He may tell us the occasions  
11 upon which SHIGEMITSU expressed that attitude or that  
12 state of mind to him if it happened more than once.

13 A Ever since this occasion of which I have spoken  
14 in my affidavit the war situation developed most unfavor-  
15 ably for Japan, and therefore every time I met him he  
16 continued to tell me that in the final analysis we would  
17 have to go as far as unconditional surrender. He has  
18 told me that on several occasions.

19 Q Now, on page 223 of your affidavit, section 263,  
20 you testified regarding an agreement of views you made  
21 with Mr. SHIGEMITSU under which the Lord Keeper of the  
22 Privy Seal would assume full responsibility for the  
23 Imperial Court and the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
24 assume full responsibility for the government. Later,  
25 on page 264, you testified that prior to June 9, 1945,



1 you had been secretly in touch with Mr. KASE, of the  
2 Foreign Office, and Colonel MATSUTANI, of the War  
3 Ministry, in connection with peace feelers or measures  
4 to terminate the war. Will you tell me why it was  
5 decided to work through these younger men in the govern-  
6 ment offices?

7 A My purpose was that I wished to know through  
8 these people the ideas and the general atmosphere pre-  
9 vailing in the various offices to which they belonged --  
10 secretly.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: -- in various  
12 government quarters.

13 Q Was this an arrangement you worked out with  
14 Mr. SHIGEMITSU?

15 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I suggest that the  
16 witness ought to be given an opportunity to answer the  
17 question and that the testimony should not come from  
18 the lectern. I object to the leading form of the  
19 question.

20 THE PRESIDENT: As the accused has said nothing  
21 hostile to your client, to SHIGEMITSU, you are really  
22 limited to examination in chief. You have been putting  
23 leading questions throughout, Major Furness, and that  
24 is a leading question. The question is disallowed.

25 MR. FURNESS: I submit it is not so, but --

1 Q In working through these younger men in the  
2 government office, was it a result of an arrangement  
3 you made with any one?

4 THE PRESIDENT: That should be disallowed,  
5 because the answer has already been suggested. However,  
6 let him answer.

7 A I did this after consulting with SHIGEMITSU,  
8 for Mr. KASE was Mr. SHIGEMITSU's private secretary.

9 Q What position did Colonel MATSUTANI occupy?

10 A I believe he was private secretary to the War  
11 Minister.

12 Q What was the reason you felt it necessary to  
13 work secretly?

14 A In view of the situation prevailing in Japan  
15 at the time, the time was not yet ripe for conducting  
16 such movements openly.

17 THE PRESIDENT: These answers do not appear to  
18 me, at all events, to make any effective addition to  
19 anything the accused in the box has said in favor of  
20 the accused SHIGEMITSU -- not a thing.

21 Q On page 247 of your affidavit, paragraph 281,  
22 you testify regarding proposed peace negotiations with  
23 Chungking through Liao Pin as an intermediary. Do you  
24 know what has happened to Liao Pin since the war ended?

25 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I suggest that



1 that question requires a very fertile mind to deter-  
2 mine its possible relevancy to anything in this case,  
3 and it is offensive. I ask that counsel be instructed  
4 not to ask questions of a similar nature. I object to  
5 this one.

6 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, if you will  
7 look at this portion of the affidavit you will find  
8 that Liao Pin represented that he could make peace  
9 with the Chunking Government, and the Foreign Minister  
10 advised that he was not a person with whom Japan should  
11 deal.

12 THE PRESIDENT: You are not trying to discover  
13 what happened to a possible witness for your accused,  
14 are you, so you can explain to the Court why you do not  
15 call him? Such questions are frequently asked in the  
16 course of a trial, but that does not appear to be your  
17 purpose, Major Furness; so the objection is allowed and  
18 the question disallowed.

19 MR. FURNESS: I would like, then, to make an  
20 offer of proof that he was tried for treason and con-  
21 victed and executed.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Any evidence you tender in the  
23 course of putting the case for the accused SHIGEMITSU  
24 will be considered by the Court, but you do not put  
25 that evidence if you are going to offer it at this

1 stage. What the Court will do I do not know.

2 MR. FURNESS: I submit, sir, that the other  
3 accused who are witnesses can only take the stand once  
4 and that I must ask all questions which I intend to  
5 ask of this witness at this time.

6 THE PRESIDENT: You stated your purpose and  
7 on that the question was disallowed, and that is the  
8 end of the matter.

9 Q Now, you testified on paragraph 253 of your  
10 affidavit regarding Mr. SHIGEMITSU's recommended policy  
11 when he was ambassador. Did he continue to advocate  
12 that policy after he became Foreign Minister?

13 A Yes, that is my understanding.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until  
15 half-past nine tomorrow morning.

16 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment  
17 was taken until Friday, October 17, 1947, at  
18 0930.)  
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